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1. INTRODUCTION 
Industrialisation, agrarian structures, nationalism, dependency and the 
role of the state have all been important themes in development studies 
during the post-war period. The focus has, of course, been mainly on 
peripheral capitalist economies in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 
reflecting the rapid internationalisation of capital in different forms during 
this period. This paper, in contrast, brings these themes much closer to 
home by examining them in the context of the European periphery during 
the interwar period, in a country which was a creation of the European 
powers, namely, Yugoslavia. 
More important, though, Yugoslavia was to prove another exception 
to the Marxist unilinear vision of development which associated the 
triumph of socialism with a high level of development of the forces of 
production and a numerous, powerful and dominant working class. In 
Yugoslavia, the interplay between industrialisation, agrarian structures, 
nationalism, dependency and the role of the state produced a potent 
mixture and another marriage between socialism and underdevelopment. 
It allowed a small and relatively impotent Communist Party, which had 
only 8,000 full members in 1941, in a country with a small working class, to 
transform itself within three years into the vanguard of a victorious, 
800,000 strong National Liberation Army. This paper explores how this 
came about. 
In order to simplify what turns out to be a complex and fascinating 
story, with some threads stretching far back into history, the exposition is 
somewhat schematic, dividing the material into manageable chunks, while 
simultaneously establishing the analytical framework and focus. Thus, 
Sections 2 and 3 set the scene by introducing the two main contra-
dictions which were ultimately responsible for creating the possibility of 
revolution, namely, the contradiction belween industrialisation and the 
specific process of class formation in the countryside and, secondly, the 
contradiction represented by conflicts over the national question. Section 4 
is more strictly chronological as it details the consequences of the inter-
play between these two contradictions and introduces the dimensions of 
external dependency and the role of the state. In Section 5 the agent of 
revolution, the Yugoslav Communist Party, is inserted into this scenario. 
Section 6 deals with the concluding drama of war and revolution and 
highlights an important and perhaps novel sub-theme, that of the role of war 
1 
itself, its geopolitics and its contribution to the eventual outcome. The 
latter is a particular blind spot in much political analysis, which tends to 
overlook the fact that most socialist revolutions have emerged out of 
international conjunctures 'of generalised war"and thus" fails to aSse"ss the 
contribution of the war process itself. 
Finally, the Yugoslav revolution has of course achieved significance far 
beyond its own borders, particularly in the 'Third World' and particularly 
because of the emergence of its own distinctive brand of 'self-management' 
socialism and its international stance of 'non-alignment' . Thus, the conclu-
sion, Section 7, also takes up the question of the ways in which the political 
economy of the revolution as described in this paper left its imprint upon 
the post-war development of socialist Yugoslavia. 
2. INDUSTRIALISATION AND AGRARIAN CLASS FORMATION 
Industrial Development between 1918 and 1941 
When the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established on 1 
December 1918, it was only in the early stages of industrialisation. Industry 
had taken root in the areas which went to make up the Kingdom during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, but had only begun to prosper during 
the first two decades of the twentieth century. In 1918, however, there were 
only 2,064 factories employing 155,000 workers, and the great majority 
were concentrated injust three branches: food, wood and electricity gene-
ration. Moreover, factory industry in 1918 was also regionally concen-
trated, with 30% and 24% of plants in Croatia and Slovenia respectively 
and only 14% in Serbia. l According to the 1921 population census about 
80% ofthe Yugoslav population depended on agriculture for a livelihood.2 
It might perhaps have been expected that the newly established 
Kingdom would make considerable progress towards becoming an 
industrial nation during the interwar period. A small industrial base 
already existed; the country was reasonably well endowed with natural 
resources, particularly with non-ferrous minerals, and climatic topograph-
ical conditions made a whole variety of agricultural activity possible. This, 
however, was not to be. While by 1938 an additional 2,193 factories had 
been established, the industrial structure had not diversified a great deal; 
Croatia and Slovenia had retained their predominant positions (although 
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this was counterbalanced by Serbian political power and state intervention, 
see Section 4 below); and the proportion of the population dependent on 
agriculture had declined only slightly to 75%.3 Between 1926 and 1939 the 
average rate of industrial output growth was 3.7% per annum, not a great 
deal faster than the growth of agricultural output which was 2.2%.4 
According to the 1938 industrial census there were still only 197,000 
workers employed in factory industry at that time, and an additional 
157,309 employed in small workshop handicraft production.5 Moreover, 
the productivity of those who were employed in industry lagged far behind 
the norm in advanced industrial countries: in the Yugoslavia of 1938, for 
example, it took 16 man-hours to produce a ton of cement; in France it 
took 3.7 man-hours.6 
For a while during the early 1920s Yugoslav industry had prospered, 
with textiles, leather and other mass consumption goods showing the most 
dynamic growth of production. 1922 saw the establishment of 170 new 
factories, the largest number in anyone year of the interwar period. 7 One of 
the stimuli was the introduction and continual fortification of high tariff 
barriers. Different industrial branches enjoyed different degrees of pro-
tection, but the average rate was 23% up until 1925, rising to 32% by 1927 
and to 46% in 1931.8 More important, however, was the booming agricul-
tural export market: this proved to be an important source of surplus for 
industrial investment and at the same time a considerable boost to domes-
tic purchasing power, and thus to the growth of the domestic market. 
Immediately after the First World War the European grain market had 
been thrown into disarray by the discontinuation of supplies from Russia, 
while grain from the important suppliers of the future like the USA, 
Canada, Argentina and Australia was not yet reaching it. This combina-
tion of circumstances was very favourable for producers in central and 
south-eastern Europe, Yugoslavia included. The grain markets of advan-
ced industrial countries had been opened up to them and, given the 
shortfall in supplies, the price of Yugoslav wheat had risen to a peak of 417 
dinars per 100 kg by 1924-25.9 The 'kulak' among the Yugoslav peasantry 
got richer; the state creamed off export taxes; industry and banking made 
large profits; and speculation was rife. Fortuitous external circumstances 
underpinned the prosperity of the immediate post-war years. 
The situation was quickly reversed when large supplies of grain start-
ed to arrive in Europe from the USA, Canada, Australia and Argentina 
during the mid-1920s. Production in these countries had increased very 
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rapidly and productivity was far higher than in central and southeastern 
Europe because of mechanisation. In 1926 the price of Yugoslav wheat 
fell to 281 dinars per 100 kg, and by 1931 Hungary and Rumania were 
selling at prices between 50 and 60 dinars perl00kg:Takert together With 
the onset of the Great Depression, the consequences for the Yugoslav 
economy were catastrophic. 
The unexpected fall in the prices of agricultural produce gave rise to the loss of the main 
source of accumulation, provoking a mUltiplier effect with severe consequences. Land-
owners were no longer able to meet their debt obligations to banks and peasants lost the 
greater part of their purchasing power because they had to hand over two or three times 
more produce in order to payoff the same nominal debt, and to buy the same industrial 
produce. Trade slumped, industrial profits declined and the sources of extended repro-
duction either diminished or disappeared. Industry and handicrafts were unable to repay 
their debts to the banks which were being stormed by depositors who were withdrawing 
their deposits. The banks became illiquid - soon, in 1929, came the wave of the great world 
economic crisis - the collapse was total. 10 
The extensive impact of falling grain prices on the Yugoslav economy 
exposed the major difficulty facing industrialisation, a difficulty which had 
been momentarily held in abeyance during the early 1920s. The problem 
was that the economy was unable to generate an internal source of surplus 
which could be made available to industry. This problem was rooted in the 
structure of the agricultural sector and the changes which it underwent 
during the interwar period. 
The Agrarian Structure before 1918 
The agrarian structures of the lands which went to make up Yugoslavia in 
1918 differed widely, reflecting the differences between the foreign occu-
pation regimes which they had suffered for centuries. In Serbia a class of 
free peasant smallholders had already been in existence for close to one 
hundred years. Shortly after Serbia won autonomy from the Turks in 1833, 
the peasantry were freed from all forms of feudal servitude. Even before 
that the Serbian peasantry had not experi~nced tight feudal bondage since 
the collapse of the Serbian medieval state during the fourteenth century. 
During the Turkish conquest most' of the Serbian feudal lords had been 
annihilated and Ottoman feudalism vested all ownership rights to 
conquered land in the Sultan, who then exacted tribute from his vassals, 
largely in the form of taxation, through the medium of military appointees 
4 
known as 'spahis'. While the Serbian peasantry could not aspire to owner-
ship of their land because few of them converted to Islam, they were largely 
left to themselves as long as they paid their taxes, undertook occasional 
public works and continued to work their land. They also enjoyed the right 
to transmit land between generations. The peculiarity of Serbia was there-
fore that the peasantry had a long tradition of relative freedom and had 
become owner-occupiers long before one could speak of a Serbian bour-
geois revolution. The result was that the Serbian agrarian structure was 
dominated by smallholdings: in 1897, 52.8% of landholdings were less 
than five hectares in size and 96% were less than 20 hectares in size (see 
Table 1).11 
In Montenegro the peasantry had a heritage of freedom which was even 
more extensive than in Serbia. The medieval Montenegrin state ofDuklja, 
which for a time had been joined with old Serbia under the Serbian 
Nemanid dynasty, was officially conquered by the Turks in 1499, but never 
subdued. The Turks controlled the main towns and lines of communi-
cation, while the peasantry lived on in the more inhospitable mountain 
areas, grouped together in tribal/clan associations. 12 The Montenegrins 
resisted the Turks for more than five hundred years, and their de Jacto free-
dom was finally recogrrised by the Ottoman Empire at the Berlin Congress 
in 1878. In pre-1878 Montenegro there had never been any feudal forms 
ofland tenure, and this situation only changed after 1878 because a deci-
sion of the Berlin Congress increased the size of Montenegro by 70%. 
The other lands which went to make up Yugoslavia had been caught up 
in a more orthodox feudal social structure, reflected in the fact that a very 
large proportion oflandholdings in these areas were less than two hectares 
in size at the turn of the nineteenth century (see Table 1). Slovenia, 
Croatia-Slavonia and the Vojvodina bore the imprint of Austro-Hungarian 
feudal systems, vestiges of which lived on into the twentieth century 
because, even though serfdom had been abolished in Austro-Hungarian 
land in 1848, no redistribution of land had occurred. In Dalmatia, which 
was directly under Austrian jurisdiction, serfdom had not been abolished 
in 1848 and so survived there until the interwar period. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as well as Macedonia stood in sharp contrast to Serbia 
because the Ottoman feudal system, which had been established in these 
areas over centuries, did not disintegrate with the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire, but rather turned into something more oppressive. In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina a large part of the population had converted to Islam and 
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Table 1. Pre-1914 Farm-Size Structure Compared with 1931 (in %) 
Historical Provinces 
Size in Yugoslavia Serbia a Croatia- . Bosnia and Dalmatia c Slovenia d Macedonia e Montenegro a VojvodinaJ 
. hectares 1897 Slavonia b Herzegovina 1902 1902 
1895 1906 
Pre-1914 Censuses 
Upt02 18.5 44.3 40.7 61.5 31.6 
2 to 5 34.3 27.2 26.4 25.8 19.4 
5 to 20 43.1 27.6 J 32.9 11.4 39.1 20 to 50 3.8 0.7 0.9 8.5 50 to 100 0.3 0.1 0.2 1.0 
Above 100 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1931 Census 
Upt02 33.8 24.4 36.5 34.0 64.2 33.1 40.7 48.2 133.8 
2 to 5 34.1 37.7 37.9 34.6 25.4 24.4 33.6 27.7 Q.7.2 
5 to 20 29.2 35.6 24.4 29.2 9.6 34.4 24.0 19.9 32.4 
20 to 50 2.5 2.2 1.0 2.0 0.7 7.0 1.5 3.4 ' 5.6 
50 to 100 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.7 '0.8 
Above fOO 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 : 0.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 190.0 
a Territory prior to the annexation of areas acquired during the Balkan Wars. 
b In 1895 Croatia-Slavonia used cadastral yokes (I c.y. = 0.5755 hectares) instead of hectares. Thus the first category 0 to 2 hectares actually represents farms from 0 
to 2.88 hectares, followed by categories 2.88 to 5.76, 5.76 to 28.77, 28.77 to 57.55, 57.55 to 1I5.1, and finally, above 1I5.1 hectares. This ha~ to be kept in 
mind when comparing relative figures for 1895 and 1931. Lest the same relative figures for properties of 50 to 100 hectares and above 100 hectare~, in both cases 
0.1 % for 1895 and 1931, give a false impression, it should be stated that this resulted from the need of rounding these figures to one decimal. 1rhe respective 
figures in 1895 were 0.135 and 0.144%, and 0.105 and 0.076% in 1931. : 
c In 1931 Dalmatia was without the small area annexed by Italy. 
d In 1902 Camiola was taken as representative of the territory ofpost-1918 Slovenia. 
e Territory of the People's Republic of Macedonia. 
J Without Srijem. 
Source: Taken from J. Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics and Economic Change, Stanford University Press, 1955, p. 389. 
received the corresponding privilege of owning a family farm (ciftlik). The 
remaining Christian population occupied the very bottom rung in the 
social structure and was unable to mount an effective popular revolt 
against the Turks as the Ottoman Empire lost its grip on the area. J3 
Instead, local Moslem landlords gradually usurped the landownership 
rights which the Sultan exercised through his local military representatives, 
and emerged as a new feudal class during the nineteenth century. When 
Austria occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, serfdom was not 
abolished because the Austrians found it expedient to rule through the 
Moslem feudatories. In Macedonia a similar development occurred, with 
the difference that there had been no mass conversion of the population, a 
large number of whom were Serbs who had lived there since medieval times 
when Macedonia or part of Macedonia was part of Old Serbia. The large 
Moslem population in Macedonia had its origins in the settlement there of 
Turkish peasants who had migrated from Asia Minor. 
Feudalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Macedonia survived 
until the interwar period, even in the areas of Macedonia which Serbia 
claimed during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913: the outbreak of the First 
World War had allowed the Serbian government no time to legislate the 
abolition of serfdom in these areas. 
Whether feudal servitude still existed or not, agriculture in all the lands 
which went to make up Yugoslavia in 1918 was very backward and the 
agrarian structure highly atomised. In addition, the country had just 
suffered the ravages of war. Two developments in the interwar period 
contributed further to the inability of the agricultural sector to provide an 
internal source of investible surplus for industrialisation. 
Agricultural Over-population 
First of all, an already unfavourable ratio of population to land in the 
agricultural sector worsened, largely due to rapid popUlation increase. 
Already during the nineteenth century, population growth had caused 
problems, particularly in Serbia where natural popUlation growth had 
been supplemented by an influx of migrants from the south and south-west 
during the later part of the century.14 This had resulted in a shift from 
pastoral to arable cultivation, and 'the population started to push at, and 
go over, the limits of the land resources to support it on the basis of existing 
agricultural technology'. 15 
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Assuming that 1.25 hectares of cultivated land per person was the 
necessary requirement to provide a decent living standard at the time, 
Yugoslavia had a surplus agricultural population of almost 3.9 million in 
1921;J6 'Fhis-compared unfavourably with--two lleighbouringcountries 
which had similar agricultural structures and levels of development (see 
Table 2). 
Table 2. Agricultural Over-Population in Yugoslavia. Bulgaria and Rumania. 1921. 1931 
and 1938 
Country 
Yugoslavia 
Bulgaria 
Rumania 
1921 
3,892 
970 
2,912 
'Surplus' population 
(OOOs) 
1931 
4,663 
1,388 
1,969 
1938 
5,011 
1,158 
2,952 
1921 
41 
27 
25 
% of agricultural 
population 
1931 
43 
31 
15 
Source: Taken from Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics . .. , p.316. 
1938 
43 
25 
21 
Moreover, by the end of the interwar period another one million people 
had been added to the category of surplus population in the countryside. 
Between January 1921 and the end of 1939, the population of Yugoslavia 
had increased from 11,984,911 to 15,703,000: this was an increase of 31% 
and was the highest in Europe over this period. Although the proportion of 
the population dependent on agriculture had declined, the absolute number 
of people had increased by more than two million from 9,456,000 in 1921 
to 11,586,000 in 1938.17 . 
Agricultural over-population tends to severely restrict the ability of . 
both the agricultural sector and the industrial sector to accumulate. Con-
sumption in the agricultural sector tends to approach the level of total 
agricultural output, leaving little left over either for investment and inno-
vation in the agricultural sector itself, or to be creamed off for industrial 
expansion. On the demand side, the size of the domestic market for 
industrial goods becomes restricted because the peasantry will be forced to 
use most of their output for feeding themselves. In turn this means that any 
concerted effort to squeeze a surplus for industrialisation out of the agri-
cultural sector, either through the market, taxation or usury, is likely to be 
counterproductive because it will cause severe hardship and be fiercely 
resisted by the peasantry. Agricultural over-population thus generates a 
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vicious circle: the creation of industrial employment is the most effective 
way of reducing pressure on the land, and yet industrialisation is itself 
hampered by this problem. As we have seen, agricultural over-population 
in Yugoslavia became steadily worse during the interwar period. At one 
and the same time this was partly a product of the vicious circle and a factor 
which aggravated it. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which agricultural over-population impedes 
industrialisation depends a great deal on the agrarian structure of the 
country in question. If a large proportion of the cultivated area is in large 
ownership units, while the mass of the peasantry can barely reach subsist-
ence on very small plots, the emergence of a dynamic agricultural sector is 
possible. The rapid proletarianisation of the peasantry provides a supply of 
cheap wage labour to large estates which may then be able to increase 
output sufficiently to generate a surplus for agricultural and industrial 
accumulation. In Yugoslavia, however, this was not the case. At the end of 
the First World War, the agrarian structure was already atomised and the 
severity of the over.,.population problem put great pressure on the 
govemment to introduce a land reform. Indeed, when it was clear that the 
end of the First World War was going to see the collapse of Austria-
Hungary, an estimated 200,000 deserters from the Austro-Hungarian 
army, largely Croatian peasants, took to the forests and started to invade 
large estates in the former Austro-Hungarian areas of Yugoslavia. These 
deserters became known as the Zeleni Kadar (the Green Army).18 They 
were reacting to the extremely inequitable agrarian structure of their 
homelands (see Table 1); they were inspired by the ideals of the October 
Revolution, and the message to the first government of the new country 
was clear. 
The Agrarian Reform of 1919 
Thus it was that the first major policy in Yugoslavia was the introduction of 
an agrarian reform. The principles of the reform were laid down in an 
interim decree of 25 February 1919, even before the country's first consti-
tution was ratified by a Constituent Assembly. The basic philosophy of the 
reform was to abolish any remaining feudal relationships, giving the land 
to those who worked it, and to reproduce the Serbian agrarian structure 
offree peasant smallholdings all over Yugoslavia. More specifically, large 
estates would be subject to expropriation if they comprised more than 50-
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300 hectares of arable land or more than 100-500 hectares of other kinds of 
land. A range was established in each of these categories because of the 
large differences in the fertility and productivity ofland in different areas of 
the country: A moderate level of compensa:tion would be paid to-the 
owners of expropriated land. 
Slowly during the 1920s, an impressive 637,328 holdings, altogether 
2,484,481 hectares, were distributed among 3,186,640 persons. 19 The recip-
ients were of two main kinds. Most of the redistributed land went to local 
peasants who were either freed from feudal servitude to become the owners 
of the plots which they worked, and! or received enlarged plots. The other 
recipients were landless peasants who benefitted from various colonisation 
programmes. For example, many soldiers from the Serbian and Monte-
negrin armies who had joined up before November 1918, were allowed to 
colonise areas of Macedonia, the Vojvodina and Slavonia, as well as 
Kosovo and Metohija.20 
The impact of the reform was inevitably limited to particular areas of 
Yugoslavia. Serbia proper and Montenegro, for example, were already 
lands of free peasant smallholdings and they were, therefore, not affected 
by the provisions of the reform. Just over half of the land distributed was in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and another quarter in South Serbia (Kosovo and 
Metohija as well as Macedonia)Y This indicates that the retitling ofland 
held under feudal obligations, rather than outright expropriation and 
sub-division, was a substantial element of the reform. Most of the 
remaining quarter of the land distributed was in the northern regions of 
Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Slavonia and the Vojvodina). There a large 
amount of land belonging to churches and the public domain was distri-
buted, and 71.1% of the land expropriated from private owners belong-
ed to foreigners (Austrians and Hungarians), many of whom had aban-
doned their estates during the First World WarP 
While the achievements of the reform were more modest than the 
original grand design to tum Yugoslavia into a land of smallholdings, it did 
result in an agrarian structure dominated by them (Table 3). By 1931, 55% 
of the land area being productively utilised was in holdings ofless than ten 
hectares in size, and only 9.7% was in holdings of more than 50 hectares in 
size.23 The average farm size was 5.36 hectares. 
Without doubt the reform staved off some of the hardships created by 
agricultural over-population, but it did not remove them altogether. For a 
while at least, it guaranteed a minimum standard of living for a large part 
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Table 3. The Distribution of Farms by Size According to the Census of 31 March 1931 
Size offarm Farms Land area 
(in ha.) % % 
No. oftotal Ha. oftotal 
Up to 0.5 158,904 8.0 43,410 0.4 
0.5 to I 175,532 8.8 135,760 1.3 
I to 2 337,429 17.0 514,372 4.8 
2 to 5 676,284 34.0 2,287,570 21.5 
5 to 10 407,237 20.5 2,873,155 27.0 
10 to 20 174,068 8.8 2,380,826 22.3 
20 to 50 49,314 2.5 1,388,570 13.0 
50 to 100 5,156 0.3 338,076 3.2 
100 to 200 1,099 0.1 147,868 1.4 
200 to 500 494 0.0 146,549 1.4 
Over 500 208 0.0 389,824 3.7 
Total 1,985,725 100.0 10,645,980 100.0 
Source: Taken from Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics . .. , p.384. 
of the peasantry and it precluded massive proletarianisation: in 1931 only 
489,018 persons, or 9.6% of those employed in agriculture, were wage 
labourers, and 40% of them were concentrated in the Vojvodina.24 The 
problem, however, of the 'dwarf' smallholding still remained: in 1931 
33.8% of the landholdings were less than two hectares in size, and they were 
fairly evenly distributed throughout all the regions of Yugoslavia (see Table 
1). A smallholding in this size range was insufficient to provide for the 
minimum consumption needs of a peasant family, even in a year of bumper 
crops. Moreover, they had been proliferating all over Yugoslavia, and 
particularly in Serbia, between the end of the nineteenth century and 1931 
(see Table 1). The agrarian reform did not and could not arrest this trend, 
which reflected the growing discrepancy between the agricultural popula-
tion and the amount ofland available on the one'hand, plus, on the other 
hand, the trend towards individual farm ownership as the co-operative 
form of ownership, known as the zadruga, went through its fmal stages of 
disintegration.25 Furthermore, it was this excessive sub-division of the 
land, rather than an increase in area under cultivation, which provided the 
bulk of the 250,450 new jobs generated in the agricultural sector between 
1921 and 193i.26 
The great problem with the agrarian reform was, however, that it 
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helped to translate the problem of agricultural over-population into an 
agrarian structure which effectively precluded a longer-term capitalist 
solution, namely, the rapid industrialisation of the country. An agrarian 
structure dominated by smaliholdings, together with a peasantry~which 
was only equipped with backward techniques of production, could pro-
vide neither a source of investible surplus for industry nor a growing 
domestic market for industrial products. The legacies of history, the 
increase in population and the changes in the agrarian structure presented 
severe difficulties for the capitalist industrialisation of Yugoslavia during 
the interwar period. 
3. THE NATIONAL QUESTION 
Introduction 
The establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 1 
December 1918 brought together the territories of Serbia, Montenegro, 
Croatia-Slavonia, Slovenia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Vojvodina and Yugoslav Macedonia. Since 1878 Serbia and Montenegro 
had formally been independent Kingdoms. Before that they had both been 
part of the Ottoman Empire since the end of the Middle Ages, although 
Serbia had effectively been an independent state since 1833 and Monte-
negro likewise since the turn of the nineteenth century. Croatia and 
Slavonia had formed an autonomous unit in the Austro-Hungary Empire 
since the establishment of the dual monarchy in 1868. Originally, the 
. Hungarian King had acquired Croatia and Slavonia in 1102 and then, in 
1526, after the defeat of Hungary by the Turks at the battle of Mohacs, 
Croatia became part of the Austrian Empire, as did the remnants of 
Hungary. Part of Croatia and the whole of Slavonia, however, were 
conquered by the Turks in the 1520s and 1530s, becoming part of Austria-
Hungary after the Peace of Karlovci in1699 and the Peace of Pozarevac in 
1718. Thereafter, these areas came directly under Austrian jurisdiction 
(rather than indirectly via Hungary), because they were joined with the 
Military Frontier territory which had been constituted in 1578 by the 
Austrians along the borders with the Ottoman Empire. Before 1918 there 
had been no territorial unit known as Slovenia, only a number of Austrian 
Crown-lands inhabited by Slovenes .. Indeed, Slovenes had never had their 
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own medieval state, for these Crown-lands had been under various Ger-
manic rulers since the eighth century. The Crown-lands of Carniola and 
parts of the Crown-lands of Styria, Carinthia and Prekomurje went to 
make up the new territorial unit of Slovenia (which, incidentally, did not 
include all the areas inhabited by Slovenes). Similarly, Dalmatia had been 
an Austrian Crown-land, but only since 1814; before that it had known a 
whole series of masters (including Venice, the Republic of Dubrovnik and 
France). Bosnia and Herzegovina had been fmally conquered by the Turks 
in 1463 and had remained under Turkish rule until it was occupied by 
Austria-Hungary in 1878 and later formally annexed in 1908. Apart from a 
period under the Turks in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
Vojvodna had been part of Hungary since the ninth century. Between 1849 
and 1860 it had briefly enjoyed the status of a province - the Serbian 
Vojvodina - within the Austrian Empire. Yugoslav Macedonia had 
originally been the centre of medieval Serbia, but since medieval days had 
been part of the Ottoman Empire until Serbia reclaimed it in the Balkan 
:Wars of 1912 and 1913. 
Clearly, until 1918 the only thing which the peoples of these territories 
had in common was their ancestry in the South Slav migrations to the 
Balkans during the sixth and seventh centuries and their SUbjugation to 
, various foreign powers. Moreover, they were also divided by language and 
religion. Serbs and Croats spoke different dialects of the same language 
and used different alphabets: Cyrillic and Latin respectively. Slovenes and 
Macedonians spoke different but related languages. Croats and Slovenes 
were strongly Catholic. Serbs, both inside and outside Serbia, belonged to 
the Eastern Orthodox Church, as did Montenegrins. Large segments of the 
population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Macedonia still adhered to 
Islam. Taking all these factors into consideration, it was perhaps not 
surprising that the national question and different forms of nationalism 
should prove to be a source of conflict in Yugoslavia. 
Nationalism before 1918 
Before the formation of Yugoslavia, however, nationalism had been a 
rather weak political force among most of the South Slav peoples. Those 
peoples who had been under Austria or Hungary for a long period of time 
had become accustomed to foreign tutelage and had generally reached 
satisfactory arrangements with their masters, at least as far as ruling circles 
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were concerned. Their aspirations largely revolved around improving their 
status within the Austrian Empire, rather than involving a struggle for 
independent statehood. In the case of Croatia, independence had never 
really been highly valued or sought after: Hungary had never had to 
conquer Croatia in the fIrst place, because a section of the Croatian nobility 
had offered the Croatian crown to the Hungarian King as a result of an 
internal crisis caused by the assassination of the Croatian King Zvonimir at 
the end of the eleventh century. Thereafter, the Hungarian King and later 
the Austrian Emperor ruled Croatia through a Croatian ban (chief exe-
cutive) and from the thirteenth century onwards Croatia had a separate 
diet (Sabor)~ The Croatian nobility gradually'disappeared, and their lands 
were taken over by Hungarian and German nobles. Apart from a fleeting 
instance which provoked the Austrians to execute the heads of two lead-
ing Croatian families (Counts Zrinski and Frankopan) in 1671 for preach-
ing secession, Croatian nationalism was practically non-existent. The cele-
brated peasant rebellion led by Matija Gubec in 1573 had no nationalist 
overtones. Indeed, the peasants sought the protection of the Austrian 
emperor against local feudatories. After 1868, when Austria-Hungary 
became a dual monarchy, Croatia came under the jurisdiction of the 
Hungarian King and was able to negotiate representation in the elected 
Hungarian parliament and to achieve considerable autonomy with respect 
to internal affairs. 27 At the time of the First World War the Croatian people 
enjoyed the status of, and recognition as a, 'political people' within the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Similarly, in Slovenia nationalism was not a potent political force. The 
development of a national identity and consciousness among the Slovene 
people was inhibited by their dispersion throughout several Austrian 
provinces. Furthermore, the Slovene lands were almost completely 
Germanised: Germans made up the ruling circles, and the German lan-
guage - as well as Latin - were used in the education system above 
elementary school level. 
Nevertheless, Croatia and the Slovene provinces knew a limited na-
tional renaissance during the nineteenth century which was inspired by 
intellectuals, notably Franz Pres ern (1800-49) in the Slovene provinces 
and Ljudevit Gaj (1809-72) in Croatia. The vehicle of this national renais-
sance was language ap.d culture, as both Slovene and Croatian intellectuals 
strove to forge a literary language for their respective peoples and to 
promote the dissemination of literary publications in these languages. 
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In Croatia particularly, the language issue then became linked with the 
genesis of a wider political ideal, that of the unity of all South Slav peoples. 
It was recognised that the languages spoken by South Slav peoples had 
major features in common, and this gave birth to the 'Illyrian' movement 
which was the fIrst expression of an all Yugoslav nationalism.28 The 
geographical concept ofIllyria did not, however, encompass all South Slav 
peoples, but only those living in the northern regions of what is today 
Yugoslavia, as well as the Bulgarians. Apparently, the movement received 
the backing of the fragile Croatian capitalist class but was opposed by the 
large Croatian landowners who were generally pro-Hungarian. 29 Croatian 
nationalism was not yet on the historical agenda, but the incipient capitalist 
class was seeking liberation from Austria-Hungary by way of joining an 
alternative political unit. 
Illyrism also had an echo in Slavonia, Bosnia (see p. 16 below) and 
Dalmatia. In Dalmatia the language issue was particularly important: 
Italian was the language of administration and trade, and yet very few 
people spoke it outside of the towns. However, it was'the collapse of 
Austria-Hungary during the First World War rather than the strength of the 
Illyrian movement which eventually gave Illyrian ideas a practical channel. 
There had been no manifestation of a nationalism associated with the 
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the Middle Ages. At that time its 
expression was religious in character through the independent Bosnian 
church which embraced a heretical sect of Gnostic and Neo-Manichaean 
character. This church emerged as an expression of protest by the Bosnian 
people against the competition of the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox 
churches for their allegiance, a competition which resulted in persecution 
and a great deal of outside interference in its affairs. 
This church was, therefore, what in modern times would be characterised as a nationalist 
and democratic movement which found many adherents in a country in which Christianity 
and the two great churches were not yet fully consolidated. 30 
After the [mal conquest of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, by the 
Turks in 1481, this church disappeared altogether: the anti-Catholic and 
anti-Orthodox stance of its adherents meant that they were open to 
conversion to Islam, particularly when this brought a series of material 
privileges with it. Thereafter, the division of the population of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina into three camps - Moslem, Orthodox and Catholic -
precluded the emergence of any all-Bosnian nationalist creed,3l 
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The Catholic population tended to look towards Croatia for a lead and 
the Illyrian movement found fertile ground among them. The Orthodox 
population were ethnically Serbian and looked towards Serbia, and the 
Moslem population, from which a-Bosnian feudalclass-emerged-during 
the nineteenth century, expressed their common political aspirations 
through religious rather than national identification: during the interwar 
period the political vehicle for the Moslem popUlation all over Yugoslavia 
was the Yugoslav Moslem Organisation (Jugoslovenska Muslimanska 
Organizacija).32 
In Macedonia there were also a series of historical factors which 
impeded the development of a Macedonian national consciousness. 
Macedonia was ftrmly in the grip of the Ottoman Empire until the Balkan 
Wars of 1912 and 1913, and as has already been mentioned, a large segment 
of the population was ethnically Turkish. Furthermore, Serbia, Greece and 
Bulgaria all laid claim to Macedonia, and this had an additional divisive 
effect because the population also contained Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians. 
In consequence, a national awakening only occurred in Macedonia towards 
the end of the nineteenth century and assumed a particular form. In 1893 
an organisation which later became known as the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organisation (VnatreSnata MakedonskaRevolucionerna Orga-
nizacija generally known by its English acronym IMRO) was established 
to strive for an autonomous Macedonia within the framework of a Balkan 
Federation. It had to be a well organised and highly secret organisation 
because of the oppression which the Turks readily meted out. Branches 
were established throughout the country, and after 1896 the IMRO also 
had a military apparatus. It was, however, never more than sporadically 
effective because its ideas on Macedonian nationhood were vulnerable to 
pressure from Turks and Greeks and because it failed to foster the Mace-
donian language which only fully developed during the twentieth century. 
Of all the South Slav peoples, the Serbian people were the exception in 
that from their midst a powerful nationalist movement emerged which was 
capable of challenging the Ottoman Empire. The reasons for this stretch 
far back into history, and some aspects have not yet been fully researched. 
Before the Serbian people were conquered by the Turks at the battle of 
Maritsa River in 1371 and at the battle of Kosovo Field in 1389, they had 
had a proud history. Under the Nemanid dynasty, medieval Serbia had 
expanded to include present-day Montenegro, present-day Albania, 
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Macedonia, more than half of Greece, a chunk of Bulgaria and present-day 
Serbia up to a line just south of Belgrade. Originally, the peasantry had 
lived in freedom, grouped together in primitive communes, but as the 
Serbian state grew in size, centrifugal tendencies developed and powerful 
local leaders were able to enserf the peasantry and convert themselves into 
feudal landlords. The Turkish conquest tore up the feudal social structure, 
most of the feudal landlords were eliminated, and the imposition of the 
Ottoman feudal system gave the peasantry scope to revert to their tradi-
tional communal way of life. 33 
It was this communal way of life, the centrepiece of which was an 
agricultural co-operative known as a zadruga, which enabled the Serbian 
people to survive as a people under Turkish rule and to create the basic 
foundations for the emergence of a modern nation state. The zadruga was 
a household composed of two or more biological or small families closely related by blood 
0-1" adoption, owning its means of production communally, producing and consuming its 
means oflivelihoodjointly, and regulating the control of its property, labor and livelihood 
communally.34 
Some zadruge (pI.) did, however, consist of two or more rather separate 
families, and some property was often individually owned. In all South 
Slav lands with the exception of Slovenia and the Vojvodina, the zadruga 
was the prevailing type of rural family, but for the Serbian people it 
assumed special significance because the Ottoman feudal system allowed it 
to survive and to develop into the basis for a system of Serb self-govern-
ment which gained legitimacy within the Turkish state. As was mentioned 
above, the Ottoman feudal system made 'tax payers' rather than serfs 
out of its peasant subjects; in addition to this, the highly centralised 
Turkish state was underdeveloped and employed relatively few function-
aries, such that effective Turkish control did not extend beyond the towns 
and the main arteries of communication. 
Over the centuries of Turkish rule, a process of class differentiation 
beset Serbian society. This never progressed very far because the Turks 
were quick to eliminate or tax away those who became too wealthy. 
Nevertheless, a class of small traders did emerge, particularly as the urban 
economy expanded and money-based exchange became more widespread. 
A conjunction of circumstances ultimately forged leaders of a Serbian 
nationalist movement out of this class, and the result was the first Serbian 
uprising in 1804. Firstly, the Ottoman Empire was slowly decaying during 
the eighteenth century. Secondly, the efforts of Sultan Selim III (1789-
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1807) to reverse the situation only aggravated it further: he imposed new 
levies on the peasants which made them willing to answer a call to revolt. 
Finally, the Serbian trading class had been developing lucrative trading ties 
with the Austrian Empire and began to resent the way in which Turkish. 
rule was preventing them from further exploiting the advantages of con-
tact with the outside world. 
The fIrst Serbian uprising was led by a small trader called Karadjordje 
(Black George) Petrovic (1768-1817). Itfailed but was followed in 1815 by a 
second uprising this time led by Milos Obrenovic (1780-1860), a rival to 
Karadjordje whose many business activities included that of pig trading. 
Through the second uprising the Serbs won some important concessions 
from the Sultan, but it was not until 1833 that Russian pressure forced him 
to grant self-government to the Serbs over an area stretching from the Sava 
and the Danube southwards to a line just north of Nis. Serbia still 
continued to pay tribute to the Sultan until after the Berlin Congress in 
1878, when formal independence was achieved. 
The kind of Serbian nationalism which won liberation from the Turks 
had emerged from the grassroots of the Serbian people, but by the end of 
the nineteenth century it had been transformed into the creed of the 
Serbian ruling class. After the second uprising, the gap between the leaders 
and the led widened as the leaders of the revolution converted themselves 
into landowners and self-appointed administrators. Prince Milos (Obrenovic) 
himself became extremely wealthy. The trading class, as an incipient 
capitalist class, was too weak to promote the democratic freedoms which 
the peasantry had hoped for from the revolution. It had to consolidate its 
power through the establishment of a centralised bureaucratic state, 
and the system of local self-government which had existed under the 
Turks became an arm of central government. Indeed, the zadruga 
co-operatives gradually disintegrated during the nineteenth century as 
a result of a series of developments. These included the penetration of 
the market economy, which lured the peasantry into debt and forced the 
break-up of farms to make repayments; changes in the tax system from 
one based on the household to one based on the individual; land short-
ages arising from population increase; and the impact of an individualist 
mentality spreading from the west. 
With the rise of the bureaucratic state came the elaboration of a 
'Greater Serbia' ideology. This was fostered by a Serbian minister for 
internal affairs, Ilija Garasanin (1812-74), who developed a plan for the 
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creation of a large state around Serbia intended to include Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as well as northern Albania and to have some connection 
with liberated Bulgaria. The plan was designed to protect Serbia from 
Russian and Austrian territorial ambitions, but later became the basis for 
Serbian chauvinism and expansionist aspirations: the goal of uniting all 
Serbs within a common state. 
Nevertheless, the old democratic tradition oflocal self-government did 
live on, although in a somewhat altered form. Economic development in 
Serbia had quickly widened property differences and class differentials. 
New social layers emerged in the towns: a liberal wing of the capitalist class, 
intellectuals, artisans and other workers. These social layers subscribed to a 
democratic platform of local self-government and struggled against the 
centralised bureaucratic state. Their most prominent representative was 
the intellectual, Svetozar Markovic (1848-75), who became known as the 
first Balkan socialist. Markovic fought for the reform of the state structure 
along the lines of elected councils right down to a local level. He was 
inspired by the example of the Paris commune, but under the influence of 
the ideas of the Russians Chernishevski and Heren, he came to believe that 
a peaceful, parliamentary road to socialism was a possible one along which 
Serbia would be able to 'by-pass' capitalism. His conception of socialism 
was that of democratic local self-government based on peasant and artisan 
co-operatives, and the political obstacle to its achievement was the pre-
sence of a bureaucracy above the people, which stifled their initiative. 
Because he thought the bureaucratic capitalist state could be reformed 
away, Yugoslav communist writers often dub him a 'utopian socialist'.35 
The founding members of the Serbian Radical Party, such as Adam 
Bogosavljevic (1844-80), drew upon the ideas of Svetozar Markovic but 
their emphasis was different. They were not in general opposed to the 
bureaucracy per se, but rather to bureaucratic corruption and mistreat-
ment of the peasantry. By the turn of the century the Radicals had been 
transformed from opposition fighters into pillars of the establishment. 
Their base among the urban petty bourgeoisie meant that they came to fear 
the people, particularly after a popular uprising in 1883, known as the 
Timok Revolt. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that nationalism in Montenegro and 
the Vojvodina was always subordinate to Serb nationalism. In spite of their 
own success in resisting the Turks and in building the rudiments of a nation 
state during the nineteenth century under the bishop princes (and espe-
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cially under Petar Petrovic Njegos between 1830 and 1851), the Monte-
negrins still generally considered themselves to be Serbs and hoped for 
union with Serbia. Similarly, the majority of the population in the 
Vojvodinawere Serbs andtheir natiohal aspiration was to become part ()f 
Serbia. 
The Vidovdanski Constitution 
At the beginning of the First World War Serbia could not reckon on the 
collapse of Austria-Hungary, and it therefore did not even consider the 
possibility of a new Yugoslav political unit. Serbia's wartime objectives 
were more limited: to secure the existing borders of Serbia and, if things 
went well, to create a 'Greater Serbia' which would include all the areas of 
the Balkan where Serbs lived. On the other hand, politicians from the Slav 
areas of Austria-Hungary were divided. In May 1977, a group of Slav 
politicians in the Vienna parliament (known as the 'Yugoslav Club') issued 
a declaration calling for the unification of Croatia and Slovenia to form an 
autonomous state on a par with Hungary under the Hapsburgs. The 
initiative had come from a number of Catholic Slovene politicians led by 
Anton Korosec who later became head of the Slovene People's Party 
(Slovenska Ljudska Stranka). They were concerned about Italian designs 
on Slovene territory and were not keen on the Serbian government being in 
a position to decide the fate of Croatia and Slovenia. A different perspec-
tive was held by the Yugoslav Committee which was formed in London in 
May 1915 and made up of emigre politicians. This Committee called for a 
united Yugoslavia, a perspective which reflected the strategic interests of 
the Croatian and Slovenian c;:apitalist classes who saw themselves dominating 
the economic life of a new Yugoslavia, whereas under Austro-Hungarian 
rule they could only hope to continue playing a subordinate role. In July 
1917 the Yugoslav Committee met with the Serbian government on the 
Island of Corfu, and a joint declaration was issued - known as the Corfu 
Declaration proclaiming that the new Yugoslavia would be a free, 
independent and democratic state under the Serbian (Karadjordje) 
monarchy. The constitutional form of the new state was not, as yet, 
specified. 
The collapse of Austria-Hungary forced events in Croatia and Slovenia 
as far as those who would have wished to continue the union with Austria 
and Hungary were concerned. A National Council of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes was formed to administer the South Slav areas of Austria-
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Hungary. This council met in Zagreb on 29 October 1918, announced the 
severance of ties with the Hapsburg empire, and subsequently entered 
negotiations with the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government 
over the establishment of Yugoslavia. 
It was then that the problems started as the ideal of South Slav unity 
had to be put into a constitutional form. A conference of all the parties was 
held in Geneva in November 1918, but its proposals for an interim 
government never saw the light of day because Serb ruling circles, led by 
King Alexander, refused to ratify any government structure until this had 
been decided by a Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage. The 
scales were very much balanced in their favour: Serbia was already an 
independent state with a strong and victorious army at its command, 
whereas the National Council was only a fragile political structure in 
desperate need of Serbian military strength to quell peasant unrest and, in 
particular, the activities of the 'Green Army' (see p. 9 above). In addition, 
the hand of Serbian ruling circles was strengthened by the unilateral 
decisions of assemblies in the Vojvodina and Montenegro to join a 
united Yugoslavia under the Karadjordje dynasty. Ultimately, therefore, 
the National Council sent a delegation to Belgrade and agreed on a 
structure for an interim government which placed effective power in the 
hands of the King. This enabled the latter to proclaim the establishment of 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 1 December 1918: 
Montenegrins were treated as Serbs, and the Macedonian people already 
were being denied all recognition. Elections for a Constituent Assembly 
were to be held on 28 November 1920. 
In the run-up to the elections, no less than eight different proposals 
emerged for the constitution.36 They fell into two distinct camps: those 
which outlined a highly centralised state structure and those which outlined 
federal structures with varying degrees of decentralised power. No less than 
40 political parties formed to run in the elections, but the most important 
were the Radical Party (Narodna Radikalna Stranka), the Democratic 
Party (Demokratska Stranka), the Croatian Republican Peasant Party 
(Hrvatska Republikanska Seljacka Stranka, HRSS), the Slovene Peoples 
Party, the Yugoslav Moslem Organisation and the Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia (Komunisticka Partija Jugoslavije). 
The Radical Party and the Democratic Party were both Serb-based 
parties which favoured a highly centralised, unitaristic state structure. The 
difference between the two was that while the Radical Party was 
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formed in the nineteenth century and was based exclusively in Serbia, the 
Democratic Party was new and more all-Yugoslav in character in so far as 
it was formed in 1919 from a number of small urban parties, largely 
representing Serbs from all over Yugoslavia. The Radical Party was the main 
vehicle for Greater Serbia chauvinism. The Croation Republican Peasant 
Party was formed in 1903 by the Radi6 brothers, Antun and Stjepan, and 
was led by Stjepan Radi6 after the death of his brother in 1919. 
At the beginning of the interwar period the backbone of this party was 
the middle Croatian peasantry, and it proved to be the most powerful 
political force favouring a federal state structure which would allow 
Croatia to exercise wide autonomous powers. Both the Slovene Peoples 
Party and the Yugoslav Moslem Organisation vacillated between a unita-
rist and federalist constitutional form. The Slovene Peoples Party was a 
right-wing populist clericist party and a vehicle for the Slovenian capitalist 
class. The Yugoslav Moslem Organisation was a vehicle for Moslem 
landowners. The position of the Communist Party will be examined 
separately in Section 5. 
King Alexander used his power in the provisional government to 
predjudice the form of the constitutional proposal which would eventually 
go before the Constituent Assembly, so that the main issues were really 
settled before it met. His activities so angered the Croatian RepUblican 
Peasant Party that it refused to participate either in the provisional govern-
ment or in the Constituent Assembly. Very quickly the representatives of 
Serb and Croat national aspirations were on a collision course. 
In the elections - in which women, soldiers and certain professions were 
not allowed to vote - the Democratic Party won 92 seats, the Radical Party 
91 seats, the Communist Party 59 seats and the Croatian RepUblican 
Peasant Party 50 seatsY The total number of seats contested was 419. 
Seven months later, on 28 June 1921, the Constituent Assembly passed the 
Vidovdanski (St Vitus's Day) Constitution by 223 votes for and 196 votes 
against or absent. Only a deal with the Yugoslav Moslem Organisation 
over the level of compensation to former landowners under the Agrarian 
Reform pushed it through. Under this Constitution, political power was 
highly centralised: the King received enormous powers and the country 
was to be divided into 33 regions (ob/astz), each with a popUlation of at least 
800,000 and each chaired by an appointee of the King (a iupan). The 
demarcation of these regions did not recognise any historical precedents, 
and they were only to be granted limited jurisdiction over local affairs. 
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So it was that the Vidovdanski Constitution set the scene for severe 
conflict over the national question during the interwar period. It was not a 
constitution which could unite all the South Slav peoples: it was an 
instrument for the parliamentary consolidation of Serbian hegemony in 
the new state and thus a means of preserving the position of the Serbian 
capitalist class which was historically centred around the state apparatus. 
Because Serbs formed the largest united group in the population, the 
representatives of this class hoped to be able to count on an institutional-
ised parliamentary majority. 38 In turn this aroused fierce nationalist aspira-
tions from the other South Slav peoples, aspirations which had only been 
weakly formulated and poorly developed in the past. The main opponent 
of Serbian hegemony turned out to be the Croatian capitalist class, initially 
in alliance with the Croatian peasantry. Originally, the Croatian capitalist 
class had looked favourably on the formation of Yugoslavia: Croatia was 
the most industrially developed territory and could hope to dominate the 
economy of the new country. The Vidovdanski Constitution, however, 
held out the prospect of an unappetising political dependence on Serbia. 
The main contradiction which was to prove a source of conflict over the 
. national question ran, therefore, along the following lines: 
In the new economic unit Zagreb was the most powerful financial, industrial and trading 
centre. Belgrade attracted a concentration of political authority and became the centre of 
political power while Zagreb became the centre of economic power, namely, the centre of 
the greatest concentration of capital in Yugoslavia.39 
4. THE CONTRADICTIONS UNFOLD 
From Parliamentary Democracy to Dictatorship 
During the immediate post-war years, when the economy was expanding 
rapidly, Yugoslav society became increasingly polarised along national 
lines. Croats were systematically denied access to political power: during 
the period of 121 months between December 1918 and January 1929 Serbs 
held the office of Prime Minister for 117 months, Ministry of the Army 
and Navy for 121 months, Ministry of the Interior (controlling the police) 
for 111 months, Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 100 months, Ministry of 
Finance for 118 months, Ministry of Education for 110 months, and 
Ministry of Justice for 105 months.40 Elections were to be held every two 
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years and a measure of the political temperature was provided by those in 
1923, when the Democratic Party lost 41 seats while the Radicals and the 
Croatian Republican Peasant Party gained 17 seats and 20 seats respec-
tively. The Radicals did not win one seat in Slovenia but only 50 out of their 
total of 108 seats came from Serbia proper, indicating that Serbs outside 
Serbia were turning away from the Democratic Party and towards the 
harder-line Radicals. Indeed, a desire for compromise between Serbs and 
Croats within the Democratic Party provoked Svetozar Pribicevic, a fierce 
monarchist unitarist, to split away from this party to form the Independent 
Democratic Party (Samostalna Demokratska Stranka), which subsequent-
ly became the main representative of Serbs outside Serbia. The Croatian 
Republican Peasant Party did not win any seats at all in Serbia proper, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and the Vojvodina: 59 out of its total of 70 seats 
came from Croatia, nine from Bosnia and Herzegovina and two from 
Slovenia. The divisions in Yugoslav society as a whole were reflected in 
miniature in the election results for Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Yugoslav 
Moslem Organisation won 18 seats, the Radicals 13, and the Croatian 
RepUblican Peasant Party nine.41 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, it will be 
recalled, the population was a mixture of Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats 
and Moslems. 
Fired by the electoral success of the Croatian Republican Peasant 
Party, Stjepan Radic refused to recognise the Constitution, stirred up the 
Croatian peasantry in a vigorous campaign against it, refused to partici-
pate in parliament and went abroad to seek international support for the 
Croatian cause. On his travels he visited Moscow and afflliated his party to 
the Comintern's peasant international. These activities resulted in the 
banning of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party for a while, and Radic 
spent a brief spell in prison upon his return to Zagreb in 1925. 
The only issue which united Yugoslav ruling circles during the 
immediate post-war years was the threat of mass discontent. The response 
in this area had been a combination of concession and repression: the 
introduction of the Agrarian Reform had temporarily pacified rural areas, 
while the banning of the Communist Party in 1920 had removed a 
dangerous focus for radical opposition to the regime (the Communist 
Party had won the third largest number of seats in the 1920 elections). 
Again it was the potential threat of uncontrollable mass discontent which 
established a need to compromise: there was a point at which further 
pressure over the national question could prove to be counterproductive 
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for the Croatian capitalist class if it resulted in the paralysis of the regime at 
a time wheri'impending economic disaster required decisive action. This 
point came after the 1925 elections in which a parliamentary block consist-
ing of the Democratic Party, the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, the 
Yugoslav Moslem Organisation and the Slovene Peoples Party had won 
enough seats to be able to topple the incumbent, Serb-dominated govern-
ment. The growing hegemony of the Croatian capitalist class within the 
Croatian RepUblican Peasant Party was, however, suddenly manifest in a 
change in its tactics. Stjepan Radic abandoned his allies, recognised the 
constitution and entered into a coalition with the Radical Party, and the 
immediate threat to the political system receded. Thereafter, the Croatian 
Republican Peasant Party changed its name to simply the Croatian 
Peasant Party. 
As it turned out, however, this course of action also proved counter-
productive for the Croatian capitalist class. In the 1927 elections support 
for both the Croatian Peasant Party and the Radical Party dwindled and 
the latter began to disintegrate into factions. The electorate had previously 
been stirred up with nationalist sentiment and was then clearly disillu-
sioned by the compromising attitude of the two main protaganists. The 
political system entered a protracted crisis and the Croatian Peasant Party 
entered an opposition coalition with the Independent Democratic Party 
(the Democratic Peasant Coalition - SeljaCko demokratska Koa/icija) in 
order to renew the fight against Serbian hegemony. Another twist was, 
therefore, added to events as the Independent Democratic Party, led by 
Svetozar Pribicevic, dropped its fiercely unitarist stance and threw its 
weight behind the struggle for a federal state structure: Serbs outside Serbia 
had clearly begun to perceive that supporting Serb hegemony made them 
vulnerable to nationalist backlash in the areas of mixed popUlation where 
they lived. 
The crisis came to a head on 20 June 1928, when Punisa Racic, a Serb 
nationalist of an extremist bent, shot five members of the Croatian Peasant 
Party in Parliament. The Democratic Peasant Coalition immediately 
called for Croatian autonomy, but the King seized the opportunity to 
intervene and set up a royal dictatorship on 6 January 1929, in an effort to 
impose unity from the top. Parliament was closed, all political parties were 
banned and the state apparatus was purged from top to bottom. A series of 
acts followed which established a legal framework for the dictatorship. On 
3 October 1929, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes became 
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the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the country was redivided into nine 
banovine - each under the jurisdiction of a ban (chief executive) 
appointed by the King. The King's ideas on resolving the national question 
involved arefusalto recognise it in anyway whatsoever. 
External Dependency and the Role of the State. 
Generally taken, the scant supply of private savings and entrepreneurial talent in 
Yugoslavia was responsible not only for the large-scale foreign investment and the 
importation of entrepreneurs and highly skilled labour, but also for the role of the state as 
investor and manager in many sectors of the economy that were left to private initiative in 
advanced capitalist countries. Only the state, with its taxing capacity, could supply as a 
debtor the necessary collateral and safety for large-scale, long-term loans to finance railroad 
construction, shipping, and the development of telegraph and telephone service; only the 
central or local governments could use tax revenues to finance schools, public utilities, and 
local transportation. Moreover, the necessity of pledging certain relatively safe and ample 
government tax sources to foreign creditors led to government ownership and monopolies 
in the production and sale of several mass-consumption items, notably tobacco, cigarette 
paper, matches and salt.42 
These perceptive observations by Jozo Tomasevich establish the links 
between the incapacity of the Yugoslav economy to generate an internal 
source of investible surplus for industrialisation, the penetration of the 
economy by foreign capital and the role of the state. In the flrst place the 
nature of the dependency relationship between the Yugoslav economy and 
advanced capitalist economies during the interwar period was not simply 
externally determined. At one remove this was a product of agricultural 
over-population and the Yugoslav agrarian structures and partly of a 
specifIc process of class formation in the countryside during the interwar 
period. The latter limited the capacity of the economy to generate a surplus 
for industrialisation and left a vacuum to be fllled by foreign capital. At the 
same time the role of the state was enhanced. 
By 1937,44.1 % of total share capital in Yugoslavia was foreign owned, 
including 69.2% of share capital in the mining industry, 37.0% in cement, 
bauxite and glass, 83.0% in electricity generation, 28.8% in the timber 
industry, 32.7% in metallurgy, 69.9% in chemicals and oils and 22.7% in the 
textile industry. The top foreign investors in the Yugoslav economy were: 
France with 25.0% of the total; Britain with 17.38%; the United States with 
14.95%; and Germany with 11.13%.43 In addition to the foreign capital 
which flowed into the industrial sector, the government borrowed heavily 
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abroad to finance currency stabilization, military reconstruction and the 
repair and extension of the railway system. By 1931, the accumulated 
foreign debt had reached a total of US$572.9 million which, with the 
exception of Rumania, gave Yugoslavia the highest foreign debt per capita 
of any of the southern and eastern European countries. 44 
Another important aspect of external dependency was the change in 
the geographical pattern of foreign trade during the 1930s, which ultima-
tely proved to be an awkward constraint on foreign policy. This change is 
described in Table 4. 
Table 4. The Reorientation of Yugoslav Trade, 1933-37 (OOO's of dinars) 
Country Average 1933-35 1936 1937 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
to from to from to from 
Italy 731.8 461.5 137.2 101.7 587.1 429.8 
France 62.8 153.1 86.2 101.3 393.3 90.8 
Great Britain 161.1 328.4 431.7 346.9 464.6 409.1 
Germany 606.6 491.5 1039.1 1087.6 1361.3 1694.4 
Source: Taken from John B. Allock in A Historical Geography of the Balkans, F. Carter 
(ed.) (1977), p. 561. 
Yugoslavia's main trading partners during the interwar period were 
Italy, France, Great Britain, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Germany. Its 
main diplomatic ties were with France, Czechoslovakia and Rumania (the 
Little Entente) and then with Turkey, Greece and Rumania (the Balkan 
Entente). The change in the geographical pattern of trade between 1933 
and 1937 played, therefore, into the hands of Yugoslavia's fiercest diplo-
matic rival, Nazi Germany, and indeed this was Germany's intention. 
Between 1933 and 1937 Germany became Yugoslavia's largest single 
trading partner and, moreover, Yugoslavia's trading surplus with Ger-
many rapidly became a large deficit. Given that Italy remained a large 
trading partner, when Austria and Czechoslovakia were absorbed into the 
Third Reich in 1938 Yugoslavia's trading ties were almost exclusively with 
Tripartite Pact countries. 
As Tomasevich notes, the state became involved in a wide range of 
activities during the interwar period because the structure of the economy 
prevented the private sector from mobilising enough resources to finance 
large investment projects. In addition, the state needed to tap as many 
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sources of r~venue as possible to [mance its own activities and the repay- . 
ment of foreign loans. 
Direct state intervention in the economy assumed four principal forms: 
the operation of state-owned enterprises, the control of monopolies, tIie 
provision of state marketing agencies and the control of certain banks. 
After the railways the most important state-owned enterprises were in 
forestry, in mining and metallurgy and in armaments production. State 
control of monopolies covered salt, tobacco, kerosene and matches. The 
main state marketing agency was PRIZAD, which was established as a 
monopoly trader in the grain market at the beginning of the Great Depres-
sion. State involvement in banking came through the control which the 
government exercised over the National Bank (Narodna Banka Kraj/evine 
Jugos/avije), the Chartered Agrarian Bank (Privilegovna Agrarna Banka), 
the State Mortgage Bank (Driavna Hipotekarna Banka) and the Postal 
Savings Bank (Postanska Stedionica). 
During the Great Depression the role of the state in the economy 
increased substantially. As we have seen, PRIZAD was formed at this 
time, and the state also intervened to buy up or to attempt to bail out 
bankrupt enterprises and banks. With respect to the latter, although the 
general moratorium on debts of 1932 was largely introduced to save large 
numbers of peasants from foreclosure, it also gave the state a great deal of 
leverage over the banking sector. By 1937 the state owned more than 15% 
of industrial establishments and accounted for 20% of industrial invest-
ment and 25% of industrial production.45 
While the role of the state in the interwar period was related to the 
particular difficulties confronting industrialisation in Yugoslavia, it was 
also of considerable import for the development of conflict over the na-
tional question. The expansion of state activities allowed the Serbian 
ruling class to translate political power into economic power and so to 
undermine the Croatian capitalist class further. For example, the four 
large state controlled banking institutions were always headed by Serbs 
and they served to challenge the traditional predominance of Zagreb in this 
domain.46 Moreover, the state managed to break the First Croatian 
Savings Bank, which was the most powerful bank in Yugoslavia, by re-
peatedly refusing its applications for a debt moratorium (under the general 
moratorium on debts) in the early 1930s.47 Part and parcel of Serbian 
domination over state intervention in the economy was also widespread 
corruption and self-enrichment by officials employed in the state appa-
ratus. 
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A Regime without Foundations 
In order to be able to create the conditions for its own survival the 
interwar regime in Yugoslavia had to satisfy two basic requirements. It had 
to stem the tide of social unrest by resolving the economic problems facing 
the country. It had to make progress towards a solution of the national 
question so that an all-Yugoslav nation state could come into being. Both 
of these requirements were interrelated because, as well as reflecting a real 
grievance in itself, nationalism had become an important focus for social 
unrest generated by economic problems. 
By the time of the dictatorship the satisfaction of these requirements 
was far beyond the reach of the regime. On the economic front the 
contradictions generated by the agrarian structure, plus the impact of the 
Great Depression, had created social problems which the regime was 
incapable of solving. The real incomes of the main groups in the labour 
force had been falling steadily (see Table 5). Very large numbers of peasants 
were experiencing extreme hardship and were falling more deeply into 
debt, with the result that 'dwarf' farms were proliferating and foreclosure 
for debt repayment was becoming widespread. In response, the regime 
could only offer legal palliatives rather than long-term solutions. The 
general moratorium on peasant debts of 1932, for example, only brought 
Table 5. Indices of Real Incomes in 1930 and 1938 Compared with 1914 
1914 1930 1938 
Agricultural workers 100 68.6 68.1 
Other workers 100 91.0 83.8 
Self-employed 100 85.0 79.1 
Public employees 100 55.4 54.7 
Source: Adapted from Rudolf Bicanic, Pri/ozi Za Ekonomsku Povifest Hrvatske, 
Zagreb (1967), Table 5, p. 94. 
temporary relief to the peasantry because it also prevented them from 
obtaining further credit. The economy was in the grip of a complex contra-
diction from which the regime could not extricate it: the nature of the 
external dependency relationship left little room for manoeuvre, parti-
cularly because the state itself was having to milk th~ economy in order 
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to repay foreign loans; industry could not create jobs fast enough to solve 
the problem of agricultural over-population, and the state could only waste 
the resources which it was able to mobilise on the state apparatus itself, 
and parliclilai:ly6ri theamed forces. 48 
With respect to the resolution of conflict over the national question, the 
Serbian and Croatian capitalist classes were divided by self-interest and 
united (under Serbian leadership) by the threat of mass discontent. The 
Slovenes and Moslems continued to play the role of opportunistic brokers 
between the two sides. There was no real, permanent basis for compro-
mise, and the political quagmire of the 1920s continued into the 1930s. 
In a move to legitimise the dictatorship, King Alexander took steps to 
introduce a new constitution in 1931. Elections were held in that year but 
political parties were still banned. The newly elected parliament ratified the 
new constitution which made Yugoslavia into a hereditary constitutional 
monarchy and provided for a two-house legislative system. The dictator-
ship and the banning of open political activity had, however, fuelled an 
extreme Croatian separatist organisation known as the Ustase (the 
'insurgents' or 'rebels'). The Ustase followed in the footsteps of Dr. Josip 
Frank, a Zagreb lawyer of German Jewish ancestry who, at the turn of the 
century, had laid the foundations for an extreme anti-Serbian, anti-
Yugoslav Croatian nationalism. In 1934 the Ustase assassinated King 
Alexander in Marseilles. 
Because the heir to the throne was still under age, a regency was estab-
lished under Prince Paul to replace the King. This did not signal any funda-
mental change in the regime, although the political atmosphere did relax a 
little. In May 1935, elections were held again which were contested by two 
main groupings: the Yugoslav National Party (Jugoslovenska Nacionalna 
Stranka), which was a regime party originally formed by King Alexander, 
and the United Opposition (Udruiena Opozicija), led by Vladimir Macek, 
who had succeeded Stjepan Radic as leader of the Croatian Peasant 
Party.49 The regime party triumphed by a large margin because of the un-
just electoral law of 1931: it won 1,746,982 votes and received 303 seats in 
the lower house of parliament, while the United Opposition won 1,076,345 
votes but only received 67 seats. 50 The opposition, however, boycotted 
parliament and the new government, and with it the Yugoslav National 
Party soon collapsed. 
It was followed by a government formed under Milan Stojadinovic and 
supported by a new political formation, the Yugoslav Radical Union 
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(Jugoslovenska Radikalna Zajednica), composed of a section of the 
Radical Party, the Slovene Peoples Party and the Yugoslav Moslem 
Organisation. In other words, an attempt to incorporate rather than 
destroy the pre-dictatorship parties was made and, in opportunistic 
fashion, the Slovenes and the Moslems were willing accomplices. 
Stojadinovi6 recognised that some compromise was necessary over the 
national question: the United Opposition had grouped together significant 
political forces, including what remained of the Democratic Party, a 
section of the Radical Party and the Democratic Peasant Coalition (the 
Croatian Peasant Party and the Independent Democratic Party). In 
October 1937 a meeting was held between the Yugoslav Radical Union 
and the United Opposition to discuss ideas for a new constitution and the 
procedure for introducing it. Stojadinovi6, however, was unwilling to 
sanction a change in the constitution until the King had come of age any 
compromising agreement had to come into effect within the limits of the 
1931 constitution. 
In the 1938 elections the United Opposition increased its share of the 
votes from 37% to 45%. Nevertheless, Stojadinovi6 continued in office and 
still refused to come to an agreement outside the confines of the 1931 
Constitution. This prompted the Croatian Peasant Party and the Inde-
pendent Democratic Party to boycott the parliament. By this time, 
however, the threat from Nazi Germany and Italy was becoming more and 
more pronounced, and Prince Paul therefore forced the resignation of 
Stojadinovi6 in order to promote a sense of national unity.51 He was 
replaced by a little known Radical politician, Dragisa Cvetkovi6, who was 
charged with coming to an agreement with Macek. Thus it was that the 
agreement between Cvetkovi6 and Macek was signed on 26 August 
1939, under which Croatia became a separate banovina with limited auto-
nomous rights. 
The Second World War broke out a few days later, and the agreement 
was too limited and came too late to be able to generate the kind of nation-
al unity necessary to resist foreign aggression. Moreover, the regime had its 
han9s tied by the trading links which had developed with Nazi Germany 
during the 1930s. After repeated delays, Prince Paul fmally acceded to the 
Tripartite Pact by signing the Vienna protocol on 25 March 1941. This 
provoked a military coup during the night of 26 March, led by air force 
generals Dusan Simovi6 and Bora Mirkovi6 who were pro-British and had 
been encouraged in their enterprise by the British secret service. Hitler did 
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not delay: on 6 April 1941, the Luftwaffe bombed Belgrade and Yugoslavia 
was simultaneously invaded by German, Italian, Hungarian and Bulgarian 
troops. Yugoslavia's hurriedly marshalled defences collapsed within five 
days, and an unconditional surrender was signed on 17 April 1941. 
5. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA 
With the formation of a united Yugoslav state a united Yugoslav workers' 
party also came into being. In Belgrade between 20-23 April 1919, 
Social Democratic parties from all over Yugoslavia (in some cases only 
their Left wings) gathered together and founded the Socialist Workers 
Party of Yugoslavia [Communist] (Socijalisticka RadniCka Partija Jugo-
slavije [Komunista]).52 It immediately afflliated to the Third International. 
Later, in June 1920, a congress was held at Vukovar where the name of the 
Socialist Workers' Party.was changed to the Communist Party ofYugo-
slavia (CPY). As of July 1920, this new party had 60,649- members, of 
whom 33.8% were from Serbia and Yugoslav Macedonia, 12.3% from 
Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro, 5.5% from the Vojvodina, 3.4% 
from Dalmatia, 25.6% from Croatia and 19.4% from SloveniaY 
At the Vukovar congress the delegates also debated strategy and 
tactics, and various reformist ideas, which were a legacy from the Second 
International, were rejected: a Left majority led by Filip Filipovic, Sima 
Markovic, Zivko Jovanovic, Mosa Pijade and Djura Cvijic defeated a 
centrist minority led by Dragisa Lapcevic and Zivko Topalovic. The 
political line which emerged reflected the revolutionary optimism gener-
ated by the October Revolution: the task of the party was to consolidate 
the democratic rights won under bourgeois democracy and to prepare the 
ground for an imminent Soviet-style proletarian revolution. Indeed this 
revolutionary fervour prevented well thought-out positions on the national 
question and on the peasantry being adopted. In fact, vis-a-vis the national 
question the Communist Party appeared to be just as unitaristic as the 
Serbian ruling class: the unity and equality of all nationalities in Yugo-
slavia was unconditionally welcomed. Perhaps this reflected the fact that 
the leadership of the new party was dominated by Serbs (the rank and flle 
was not see above) most of whom, incidentally, were intellectuals. 
In any case the general attitude was that detailed problems were subordi-
nate to the prime objective of preparing the revolution. 
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In spite of seeing itself cast in the role of leader of an imminent revo-
lution, the Communist Party was not a cadre organisation at this stage. 
Moreover, it participated openly in the 1920 elections for a Constituent 
Assembly and, with 198,463 votes and 59 seats, it emerged from them as the 
third largest parliamentary force in the country. Its electoral base was 
strongest in urban centres and in the more underdeveloped regions of 
Yugoslavia. In Montenegro and Macedonia, for example, it won respec-
tively 38% and 27% of the vote. Its showing was poorest in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (5%) and in Croatia (7%).54 
. Then came a bitter and unexpected blow which the Communist Party 
was ill prepared to weather. On 29 December 1920, it was banned as an 
anti-state organisation, persecuted by the police and forced underground. 
Because, however, this change in circumstances was unexpected and 
because the Communist Party was not a cadre organisation, it was ill 
prepared for a rapid move into illegal, underground activity and the conse-
quences were disastrous. Membership declined to around 1,000, and some 
young Communists took to terrorist activities as a method of fighting the 
regime. 55 In July 1921 they succeeded in assassinating the Minister of the 
Interior, Milorad DraSkovic, and this simply gave the government even 
greater pretext for persecuting Communists. An attempt to continue open 
activity through a front organisation called the Independent Workers' 
Party of Yugoslavia (Nezavisna Radnicka Partija Jugoslavije) was also 
subsequently banned. 
The CPY then went into the doldrums and did not begin to re-emerge 
until the 1930s. In addition to not being able to engage in open political 
activity, circumstances were not exactly favourable. The Agrarian Reform 
had separated the peasantry from the working class, which itself had been 
pacified by an increase in wages and the introduction of a shorter working 
day. Moreover, the Croatian Republican Peasant Party and the Radical 
Party had a firm grip on the Croatian and Serbian peasantry by having 
become the most effective vehicles for nationalist aspirations and, in an 
attempt to secure a base in the working class, the government had wel-
comed the founding of the Socialist Party of Yugoslavia in December 1921. 
The Comintern's encouragement of the Croatian Republican Peas.ant 
Party was another blow to morale. Any hope ofleading a straightforward 
Soviet-style revolution was now a thing of the past, and consequently the 
CPY had to develop a new political line which corresponded to Yugoslav 
reality. 
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In order to be able to accomplish this task, the CPY had to develop 
appropriate positions vis-it-vis the national question and the peasantry. 
This process was hindered by three factors: the relative inexperience of the 
CPY with respect to theoretical work, thefact thattheofficialleadership 
had gone into exile and the twists and turns of Comintern policy. The fIrst 
two factors meant that there was overmuch reliance on the Comintern, 
which in turn meant that the CPY was very vulnerable when the 
Comintern evaluated situations incorrectly. 
Very rapidly the internal life of the CPY became wracked by factional 
struggles over the national question. A Right wing formed around Sima 
Markovic, who wrote a pamphlet entitled Nacionalno Pitanje u Svetlosti 
Marksizma; Ustavno Pitanje i Radnicka Klasa Jugoslavija [The National 
Question in the Light of Marxism; the Constitutional Question and the 
Working Class of Yugoslavia]. In it he claimed that the working class 
should defend the unity of Yugoslavia against the devisive nationalisms of 
the Serbian and Croatian capitalist classes. The kind of unity which he 
envisaged would involve some regional autonomy to achieve an atmos-
phere of national peace in which the class war could again come to the fore. 
A Left wing opposed this position with the view that it was necessary to 
fight for the self-determination of the peoples being oppressed by Serbian 
hegemony. At the third conference of the CPY held in Belgrade in January 
1924, the dispute was formally resolved by the adoption of the Comintern's 
position calling for the break-up of Yugoslavia into separate states because 
no real basis existed for a united Yugoslav state. The factional struggle, 
however, continued after the conference. 
A turning-point came after the eighth conference of the Zagreb party 
organisation, held in Zagreb during the night between 25 and 26 February 
1928, at which Josip Broz made a determined plea for an end to factional 
struggle. This position won the day, and an anti-faction group dominated 
the new local committee. J osip Broz was elected to the post of political 
secretary. 
A determination to put an end to damaging factional struggles then 
also became a feature of the fourth congress of the CPY, held in Dresden at 
the beginning of November 1928. Meanwhile, however, the Comintern had 
adopted a left turn at its sixth congress, and at its fourth congress the CPY 
had to bring its strategy and tactics into line. The basic perspective was 
that the developing world economic crisis had put revolution on the histor-
ical agenda again, and therefore Communist parties should prepare for 
insurrections. 
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The consequences of this change in strategy were disastrous for the 
CPY. Again it prepared for an uprising, this time to destroy Yugoslavia 
and to create the independent states of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and 
Montenegro. (This was still the political line on the national question). It 
actually called for an uprising when King Alexander established the dicta-
torship and found itself isolated with only 3,500 members and as many 
youth members. The regime responded with a witch-hunt, and around 400 
CPY members lost their lives and many more were imprisoned. (Josip Broz 
was sentenced to five years' imprisonment around this time.) The CPY 
virtually collapsed. Once again it had paid the price for not developing a 
strategy and tactics which were consumate with Yugoslav reality. 
It was not until 1932 and 1933 that the CPY began to recover. Amund 
that time a number of former leading members started to return from 
prison, and the ranks were also becoming swelled by an influx of young 
people. By the beginning of 1934, membership figures had reached 2,08l. 
Moreover, a political terrain of struggle was beginning to open up for the 
CPY, a terrain which had both national and class dimensions. The class 
dimension was provided by the popular antipathy generated by the 
dictatorship and by the severe hardships being experienced by both 
workers and peasants as a result of the Great Depression and the problem 
of agricultural overpopulation. The national dimension was provided by 
the continuing deadlock over the national question and by the declining 
credibility and influence of the main parties involved in the deadlock. An 
indication of how these two dimensions combined to produce a change of 
consciousness among one section of the population had been provided by 
the switch from a unitarist to a federalist position by the Independent 
Democratic Party (the main representative of Serbs outside of Serbia, see 
p. 24 above). 
Gradually the CPY rose to the challenge. At its fourth national confe-
rence, held in Ljubljana on the 24 and 25 December 1934, the CPY 
recognised the threat of fascism to the workers' movement and launched 
the idea of developing a national anti-fascist front. In the words of Dusan 
Bilandzic this represented the 'beginning of a tum in the politics of the CPY 
away from the path of class v. class towards a mass democratic and revolu-
tionary movement'. 56 Moreover, this tum preceded the decision of the 
seventh congress of the Comintem (held in August 1935) to promote the 
formation of 'popular fronts' as a counter to the fascist threat. 
Nevertheless, the fourth conference still stuck to the break-up of 
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Yugoslavia as a solution to the national question, although it did sanction 
plans for providing Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia with national party 
structures under the umbrella of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. 
After the Split Plenum (Split being a town on the Adriatic coast) of 1933, 
however, the break-up solution was abandoned and replaced with the 
notion of self-determination for all oppressed peoples within a Yugoslav 
context. 
By the mid-1930s, therefore, the CPY was equipped with new politics, 
seemingly more appropriate to Yugoslav reality, and in 1937 it acquired a 
new leadership, based in Yugoslavia, when the Comintern appointed Josip 
Broz 'Tito' as general secretary. 57 Tito proceeded to tighten up the party 
apparatus and appoint a new, younger generation of leaders. At the 
beginning of 1938 the provisional Central Committee of the CPY was 
made up of Edvard Kardelj, Aleksandar Rankovic, Milia Marinko, Franc 
Leskosek, Milovan Djilas and Ivan Milutinovic, all of whom were 
important names of the future. 
The next step was to attempt to make the 'popular front' tactic effective 
by building a mass anti-fascist movement. To employ this tactic, however, 
the CPY had to build an anti-fascist movement which was supported by 
the more progressive bourgeois political parties, and in Yugoslavia this was 
not possible. All the overtures which the CPY had made to the parties of 
the United Opposition (through a front organisation called the United 
Workers' Party [Jedinstvena Radnicka Partija]) had come to nothing. 'In 
the circles of the Yugoslav bourgeoisie there was a complete absence of 
forces wishing to co-operate with a workers' party behind which stood the 
CPY' . 58 In fact this was the final political outcome of the contradiction 
between the Serbian and Croatian capitalist classes and of the more 
general contradiction between industry and agriculture. The resulting 
configuration of bourgeois political parties could not unite against the 
threat of fascist aggression and mobilise the workers and peasants under 
the banner of an all-Yugoslav nationalism. It could only unite against the 
workers and peasants while the deadlock over the national question con-
tinued. This left the growing political terrain of an all Yugoslav anti-fascist 
struggle entirely to the CPY. As a result: 
In contrast to many other European countries, the process of creating a Popular Front in 
Yugoslavia did not develop within a framework of either narrow or broad or temporary or 
longer term coalitions between the Communist Party and particular bourgeois and other 
parties. The CPY managed to rally ever broader layers of the people around its own poli-
tical platform. 59 
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By default, therefore, the CPY was building a united front of people 
with similar class interests, rather than a popular front which involved 
alliances with bourgeois parties. Moreover, it was this which prevented 
the CPY from suffering any serious set-backs as a result of the agreement 
between Cvetkovic and Macek and the pact between Stalin and Hitler. 
When Yugoslavia acceded to the Tripartite Pact, the CPY had been 
able to mount massive protest demonstrations all round the country 
creating an atmosphere which was conducive for the coup. In October 
1940, the fIfth conference of the CPY was held in Zagreb and future 
perspectives were clearly formulated: the second imperialist war had put 
socialism on the historical agenda again all over the world, and the main 
task of the CPY was, therefore, to win over the masses against fascism and 
to carry out a -revolutionary democratic transformation of Yugoslav 
society.' By 1941 CPY membership had risen to around 8,000, and 
membership of the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia (Savez 
Komunisticke Omladine Jugoslavije) had risen to around 30,000. When 
the invasion came and the interwar regime collapsed, the CPY alone held 
the key to the creation of a new Yugoslavia. It was launched on a path 
along which it would be able to participate in a revolutionary reckoning 
without having to share power with any other political formation. 
6. WAR AND LIDERATION 
Introduction 
In this section the main objective is to explore the socio-political aspects of 
the liberation war which finally brought the CPY to power at the head of a 
national liberation army which, by 1945, was 800,000 strong. The military 
aspects of the struggle will only be depicted briefly in broad outline, as 
follows:60 
After Germany had invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, the 
CPY called for an armed uprising against the occupying powers. 
Detachments of Partisans were formed all over Yugoslavia, and the up-
rising started in Serbia on 7 July. It quickly spread all over the country, and 
large areas of territory were liberated. This provoked enemy counter-
offensives in which most of the liberated territory was lost by the end of 
1941. Thereafter, several geographically separate loci of struggle developed 
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in Slovenia, Slavonia, the Srijem and Macedonia. The most important, 
however, was in the western mountainous regions of the country, where 
Tito and the Supreme Command had retreated after the Germans had 
recaptured the liberated territory around Uzice (now-Titovo UZice) in 
south-west Serbia. With the Supreme Command went the bulk of Partisan 
fighting forces, from which 'proletarian brigades' were formed to consti-
tute the embryo of mobile regular units of the National Liberation Army of 
Yugoslavia (Narodnooslobodilacka Vojska Jugoslavije). Between the end 
of 1941 and the end of 1943, the numbers of these forces fluctuated between 
about 7,000 and 25,000 men and women. 
Mter the retreat from Uzice, the Supreme Command had settled in 
Foca, a small town in an area known as the Sandjak (eastern Bosnia). In 
May 1942 enemy pressure (the so-called Third Enemy Offensive) forced 
the Supreme Command to move, and Tito took the decision to head north 
into western Bosnia.61 By November 1942, the Supreme Command had 
reached Bihac, which at that stage was in the heart of a large area of liber-
ated territory in western Bosnia. 
There then followed the most heroic episodes of the liberation war 
when combined German, Italian and quisling forces twice attempted to 
encircle and destroy the main Partisan forces. During the Fourth Enemy 
Offensive, between mid-January and early March 1943, the Partisans were 
forced southwards and, after fierce fighting, only just managed to break 
through the enemy cordon across the canyons of the Neretva River, 
slightly south of Jablanica. This heroic retreat was notable for the large 
numbers of wounded Partisans who were safely evacuated across the river. 
The Fifth Enemy Offensive came soon thereafter in May-June 1943. This 
time the main Partisan forces were surrounded on Mt. Durmitor, between 
the Piva and Tara Rivers in Montenegro. The ensuing battle was the most 
decisive of the war as the Partisans attempted to break out of the cordon 
near Tjentiste on the Sutjeska River. At the Sutjeska about 6,000 Parti-
sans, comprising about half the main fighting force, lost their lives. Never-
theless, Tito and the Supreme Command broke through and the Partisans 
were by no means completely annihilated as the Germans had hoped. 
Mter surviving the Fifth Enemy Offensive, the tide began to turn for 
the Partisans. When Italy capitulated in September 1943, they were able to 
capture large amounts of Italian arms and equipment which -greatly 
speeded up the process of forming a regular army. New recruits flocked to 
join up: by the end of 1943 the Partisan units had become the National 
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Liberation Army and were ready for frontal warfare. The key to victory lay 
in the liberation of Serbia and the capture of Belgrade, and operations 
designed to achieve this objective began in the spring of 1944. In September 
1944, units of the Red Army entered Yugoslavia from Rumania and 
Bulgaria and assisted the National Liberation Army to capture Belgrade, 
an operation which began on 11 October and was complete by 20 October. 
Thereafter and until the end of the war, the National Liberation Army was 
largely involved in fighting the retreating German troops across the north 
of Yugoslavia and in cutting off those German troops who were attempting 
to retreat through Yugoslavia from Greece. 
The Occupation Regimes 
Mter the invasion and collapse, the disunity of Yugoslavia was quickly 
translated into a geographical dismemberment which was propelled by the 
territorial ambitions of the different invaders and fuelled by pro-Axis 
separatist forces inside Yugoslavia (see Map 1). Italy annexed part of 
Dalmatia, part of Slovenia and a small part of Montenegro (around the 
bay of Kotor); Hungary annexed a large part of the Vojvodina (Backa) and 
a small part of Slovenia; Bulgaria annexed virtually the whole of Yugoslav 
Macedonia and a part of southern Serbia as well as Kosovo, and the 
western parts of Yugoslav Macedonia were annexed to Albania. The rest of 
Yugoslav territory was occupied by German and Italian troops and ruled 
with the help of local collaborators. 
Just before German troops had entered Zagreb the Ustase had exe-
cuted a mini-coup and proclaimed the establishment of the 'Independent 
State of Croatia', with Ante Pavelic at its head. It was in fact just a puppet 
state which Hitler subsequently tolerated because of the pro-fascist, racia-
list politics of the Usta'Se and the attractiveness of a divide-and-rule policy. 
The Independent State of Croatia came to comprise Croatia proper, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and part of Dalmatia. Its population was 6.3 
million of whom 37% were Moslems, 30% Serbs and 27% Croatian 
Catholics. Military matters were the preserve of the Germans and Italians, 
who divided the territory roughly 50-50 between them with the Italians 
occupying the western zone and the Germans the eastern one. (see Map 1). 
At least in the German zone, however, the Ustase regime had a free hand to 
pursue its racialist pogroms amongst the Serbian population. For. this 
purpose the regime used the sadistic and fanatical Ustase militia, although 
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it was also allowed to constitute a regular army (known as the domobranz) 
whose troops were to act as auxiliaries to the occupying troops. 
The Ustase plan for the two million Serbs in the Independent State 
of Croatia was to deport one third of them to Serbia, convert one third 
to Catholicism and exterminate the remaining third. During the first six 
months ofUstase rule, 120,000 Serbs were officially deported to Serbia and 
many more fled there. Almost a quarter of a million Serbs were converted, 
and several hundred thousand were massacred or died in concentration 
camps.62 
Germans alone occupied Serbia, which was put under the direct 
control of a military commander. The uprising of July 1941, however, 
caught the Germans rather unprepared because they had withdrawn their 
operational units to be deployed on the Eastern Front and had left behind 
only rather insubstantial garrison units. This prompted them to set up a 
puppet regime under General Milan Nedic for the purpose of mobilising 
forces locally to quell the uprising. Nedic was a former Minister of the 
Army and Navy who had been relieved of this post in November 1940 for 
urging that Yugoslavia join the Tripartite Pact. He was never, however, 
trusted by the Germans because of Hitler's racial policy towards the Serbs 
and because it was felt that any Serbian puppet government would quickly 
fall in with the Allies, should there be a landing in the Balkans. The forces 
. at his disposal were, therefore, much inferior to those at the disposal of the 
Ustase and consisted of a State Guard, together with some volunteer 
detachments organised by the Serbian Fascist, Dimitrije Ljotic. Later, 
when the volunteer detachments were supplemented by a section of the 
Cetnici (see the next sub-section below) who had gone over the Germans, 
they were reorganised as the Serbian Volunteer Corps and put directly 
under German command. 
In Montenegro, the Italians were willing to adopt a very liberal 
occupation policy and, with the support of a group of Montenegrin 
politicians who wished to see an independent Montenegro, they were about 
to proclaim Montenegro an independent Kingdom under Italian protec-
tion. This project was nipped in the bud, however, by the massive 
Montenegrin uprising of 13 July 1941, in which the whole of Montenegro 
was liberated apart from a few towns. Thereafter, the Italian occupation of 
Montenegro assumed more of a military posture. 
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The Civil War Dimension of the Liberation Struggle 
Part and parcel of the CPY's liberation struggle against the foreign enemy 
was a bitter civil war against the various quisling forces and againstrival 
pretenders to predominance in a post-war Yugoslavia. While the various 
quisling forces, and particularly the Ustase, represented a military threat to 
the Partisans, they did not represent a political threat because they were so 
closely identified with the occupying powers that they could not hope to 
retain any political credibility if the occupying powers were defeated. This 
was not the case with the Serbian Cetnici, who became the armed 
representatives of the Yugoslav government-in-exile and vied with the 
Partisans for the privilege of deciding the fate of Yugoslavia after the War. 
The Cetnici (meaning 'guerrillas') followed a long tradition of Serbian 
prowess at guerrilla warfare stretching back to the time of Turkish rule and 
the First Serbian Uprising. Officially, however, the Cetnici came into being 
at the beginning of the twentieth century as units of the Serbian army which 
were sent into Macedonia to harass the Turks and strengthen the pro-
Serbian elements among the Macedonian population. They were used 
again during the First World War. During the interwar period not a great 
deal of attention was paid to the development of Cetnici military units, but 
a number Cetnici associations formed. The largest of these was the Cetnici 
Association, presided over by Kosta Pecanac from 1932 onwards. The 
membership of these associations was largely from the petty bourgeoisie 
and the peasantry and they stood for the defence of Serbdom against both 
domestic and foreign enemies. Indeed, Punisa Racic, who shot the five 
representatives of the Croatian Peasant Party in parliament, was the leader 
of a Cetnici association. 
Nevertheless, the wartime Cetnici movement did not have its origins 
in the Cetnici associations of the interwar period. It was started by Colonel 
Draza Mihailovic, who had been Deputy Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav 
Second Army and was located in northern Bosnia at the time. of the 
collapse of Yugoslavia. Instead of surrendering with the majority of 
Yugoslav Army Officers, he and a few men made their way to Ravna Gora 
in Serbia (see Map 1) and proceeded to establish it as a gathering point for 
Cetnici resistance to the foreign enemy. In southern Serbia, Kosta Pecanac 
had already organised an armed band with funds provided by the Yugoslav 
Army to establish official Cetnici units. Peeanac and these Cetnici, how-
ever, soon capitulated to the Germans and became part of the Serbian 
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Volunteer Corps, so that Mihailovic was left as undisputed head of the 
wartime Cetnici movement. 
Initially, Mihailovic enjoyed some important advantages over his 
rivals, the Partisans: the government in exile was quick to legitimise his 
position by appointing him Minister of the Army, Navy and Air Force and 
Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command. In addition the Allies, principally 
the British, gave him important political support by appointing various 
military missions to his headquarters and sending occasional supplies. In 
the longer run, however, there were four basic reasons why the Partisans 
I 
were always more likely to emerge on the winning side. 
First of all, the Cetnici military strategy was one of 'wait and see'. 
Mihailovic expected that the Allies would eventually make a landing in the 
Balkans, and in the meantime Cetnici policy was to offer only token 
resistance to the occupying powers so that Serbian lives would not be 
sacrificed unnecessarily. This strategy stood in sharp contrast to that of the 
Partisans, who were prepared to use every means and opportunity to 
harass the enemy no matter what the cost in lives. Moreover, the Cetnici 
could not stand by and watch the Pl').rtisans take the initiative; after a short 
initial period of tentative negotiations over joint operations against the 
enemy - which the CPY was willing to contemplate because it was 
consonant with its desire to create a broad anti-fascist resistance movement 
- the Partisans became enemy number one. This launched the Cetnici 
down a slippery path leading from de facto to open collaboration with the 
enemy and to an unhealthy dependence on them for arms and ammuni-
tion. The supreme irony came when the Cetnici even started to collaborate 
with the Ustase against the Partisans. While Mihailovic himself generally 
avoided open collaboration with the enemy, a large number of his 
commanders negotiated written agreements with the Germans, the Italians 
and the Ustase state.63 As the wait for the Allied landing became longer 
and longer, so the Cetnici appeared more and more to be just another 
quisling force in the eyes of both the people and the British. For the 
Partisans, Cetnici collaboration meant that the civil war in which they were 
engaged merged imperceptibly into the struggle against the foreign enemy, 
and they grew in stature in the eyes of both the people and the British. In the 
summer of 1943 the ,British adopted a policy of equal assistance to 
both the Partisans and the Cetnici. In December 1943 they stopped all 
supplies to the Cetnici and by May 1944 the last member of the last British 
mission to Cetnici headquarters had left. 
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Secondly, being an exclusively Serb-based (including Montenegrins) 
movement, the Cetnici really could not hope for much popular support 
from the non-Serbian sections of the population. This was made even more 
remote by theprofessedCetniCi politiCal desigils f6r YugoslaVia after tne 
Second World War. Their Yugoslavism was merely token, for their main 
objective was the creation of a Greater Serbia which would encompass all 
the areas of Yugoslavia not inhabited by Serbs. Ideologically, therefore, the 
Cetnici were trapped by extreme Serb nationalism, and this left the popular 
appeal of an all-Yugoslav nationalism entirely to the CPY. At the same 
time, however, it would be wrong to conclude that the Cetnici were fighting 
for a return to the kind of regime which existed in the interwar period. 
Their other objectives were similar to those oflower-ranking army officers 
who have executed nationalist coups in many peripheral capitalist 
countries since the Second World War: they wished to introduce radical 
social reforms and envisaged an extensive role for the state in economic life. 
Moreover, their social base was similar: the Cetnici relied on a section of 
the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and Mihailovi6 himself was 
oflower middle-class origins (his father was a country clerk in a small town 
in southern Serbia and he had chosen an army career as one of the few 
channels open to him for social advancement). 
The third reason why the Cetnici were at a disadvantage compared with 
the Partisans was that they were badly organised and undisciplined. In 
particular, an effective centralised command structure was lacking. The 
Cetnici units were essentially territorial rather than mobile, and many of 
them had sprung up under self-appointed leaders whom Mihailovic found 
it difficult to bring under control. This was particularly the case with units 
among the Serb popUlation outside Serbia - i.e. in Montenegro and in the 
Independent State of Croatia. Milhailovic did not really begin to form 
mobile units until it was already too late. In contrast, the main Partisan 
fighting force was mobile, extremely well disciplined and firmly under the 
control of a centralised leadership with clearly understood what it was 
fighting for and how to do it. 
Finally, Mihailovi6 continually underestimated and misread the poli-
tical and military abilities of the Partisans: 
The units are very poorly led and commanded owing to the lack of trained commanding 
cadres; Actions of various groups are not co-ordinated, either to tasks or time and amount, 
essentially to speedy and sudden attacks particularly during the night; In defence, and some-
times even in offence, they avoid decisive battles, and in cases when they meet a superior 
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enemy, they avoid decisive battles and they try to get away from every difficult situation; 
Killing of our officers (for the purposes of wrecking our system of organisation and 
command) and the operation of trojkas (for spreading panic in our ranks) are the main 
features of their actions. 
Partisan units are composed of a motley of rascals, such as Ustashas, the most blood-thirsty 
enemies of the Serbian people, Jews, Croats, Dalmatians, Bulgarians, Turks (Moslems), 
Hungarians and all other nations of the world ... Because of this mixture, the fighting value of 
the Partisan units is low, a fact partly due to their poor armament; 
The Partisans are masters of propaganda, which they mostly base on their fight against the 
occupier, as if the occupier did not arm them for the struggle against the Serbian people. In 
misleading the masses their chief argument is bluff, which they use very successfully, both in 
counteracting our propaganda and in spreading their own [SiC].64 
Although Mfuailovic claimed to have an army of around a quarter of a 
million in 1941, a lot of these troops were only on paper: on call or on 
mobilisation registers in areas under Cetnici control. Effective Cetnici 
fighting strength probably never exceeded 50,000 men. During the Fourth 
Enemy Offensive the Cetnici were charged with holding the south bank of 
the Neretva, and the Partisans inflicted a decisive defeat on them when they 
broke through. Between the Fourth and Fifth Offensives the Partisans 
went on to rout the remainder of the Cetnici forces in western Yugoslavia 
south of the Neretva River. The final reckoning for the Cetnici came when 
the National Liberation Army moved into Serbia in 1944. Mihailovic 
himself was finally captured alive as late as 12 March 1946, in the area of 
Visegrad in eastern Bosnia.65 He was later executed after a lengthy trial. 
The Social Base of the CPY and the National Liberation Army. 
In a largely agrarian country it was only natural that the bulk of an 800,000 
strong National Liberation Army would consist of peasants. The same was 
also true of the 141,000 members ofthe CPY atthe end of the War (50,000 
CPY members died during the War).66 It would, however, be wrong to 
conclude that it was the peasantry who made up the most important quali-
tative element in the social base of the CPY and the National Liberation 
Army. This role was played by social groups from urban areas who pro-
vided the leadership of the struggle and carried it through its most critical 
stages. 
Evidence to support this assertion comes first of all from a sample of 
638 CPY members in 1940: 251 of them were intellectuals, 212 manual 
workers, 44 salaried employees and only 31 were peasants.67 Moreover, of 
45 
the 29 members of the Central Committee elected in that year, half of them 
were workers and only one of them was a peasant. At a micro-level, 
Bette Denich has carried out a study of the sources of revolutionary leader-
ship in the Ufice region of south-western Serbia, and I1erresufts coliform 
with the above pattern.68 Of the main post-war leaders in local govern-
ment, in the CPY and in youth organisations in the Ufice region, 40% had 
been secondary school students before the War, 11 % university students, 
16% teachers, 26% craftsmen or manual workers, 4% white-collar workers 
and only 3% peasants. 
This aspect of the social base of the leadership of the Partisans and the 
National Liberation Army is not surprising if one recalls the election results 
which showed the greatest support for the CPY to be in small towns and in 
the more underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia (see p. 33 above). 
Furthermore, it was the Partisans who came from urban social groups who 
carried the struggle through its most critical movements during the Fourth 
and Fifth Enemy Offensives: for ex~mple, 57% of the leaders in the Ufice 
region had joined the Partisans in 1941. Moreover, it was the 'Proletarian 
Brigades' which proved to be the Partisans' most effective fighting forces in 
difficult times. The Proletarian Brigades were not strictly 'proletarian', as 
Djilas indicates in his comments about the setting-up of the First 
Proletarian Brigade on 21 December 1941 (Stalin's birthday): 
The brigade was proletarian not in a literal but in an ideological sense: the workers in the 
brigade were a minority; the majority was made up of party members and Communist Youth. 
But the designation 'proletarian' was a recognition of the ultimate goal.69 
One can assume, however, that a large part of their complements were 
recruited from among urban social layers. 
In addition to providing leadership, urban recruits also brought some 
military expertise to the Partisan struggle. This had been acquired by 
members of the CPY and others through their participation in the Spanish 
Civil War. A total of around 1,300 Yugoslavs had participated in the 
Spanish Civil War, and 700 of them had gone there directly from Yugo-
slavia.70 Those who survived and returned to Yugoslavia became the 
Partisans' first military strategists and played a particularly important role 
in the 1941 uprising in Serbia. 
The study by Denich also reveals other important information about 
the social base of the CPY and the National Liberation Army. For example, 
71 % of the leaders from the Ufice region were less than 27 years of age in 
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1945 and 25% were less than 21. This is again in conformity with the 
national picture: 75% of the National Liberation Army was made up of 
young peop1e. 71 The politics of the CPY had a strong appeal amongst 
young people and most of its leaders were young. 
It is also notable that 16% of the leaders from the Uzice region were 
women. Nationally, more than 100,000 women took part in the fighting 
units of the National Liberation Army (12.5% of its total complement in 
1945), and over a quarter of them lost their lives. The Partisans, unlike 
the Cetnici, encouraged women to play an active role in the struggle, 
and this was probably an important factor in winning over the peasantry 
to their side in many areas.72 
Whether the Partisans relied relatively more on some nationalities than 
on others is difficult to say. At the end ofthe War the National Liberation 
Army was most certainly multi-national in character. However, there is 
reason to say that Serbs and Montenegrins played a critical role in the 
revolution: briefly, it was Serb units from Serbia who formed the initial 
backbone of the main Partisan fighting force in the mountainous regions 
of western Yugoslavia. These units were then supplemented by Monte-
negrin units and units formed from among the Serb population of the 
Independent State of Croatia. Croats only began to join the Partisans en 
masse after the capitulation of Italy in September 1943.73 Curiously, 
therefore, at a critical juncture in the War Serbs fought against Serbs 
(Cetnici fought against Partisans) to decide the future of Yugoslavia. These 
points will become clearer in the next section. 
Summarising the points made in this sub-section it would appear that 
the Yugoslav revolution was made by young peasants who were spear-
headed and led by young Serbs (and Montenegrins) from urban social 
groups. 
The Crucial Geopolitical Terrain 
Without a doubt the CPY and the Partisans virtually won their war 
between the end of 1941 and the end of 1943. For the most part the drama 
was enacted on or close to the territory of the Independent State of Croatia 
(Croatia proper, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as part of Dalmatia). 
This area of Yugoslavia was important to Partisan success not only because 
of its rugged terrain, but also because located within it was a political jigsaw 
puzzle which the Partisans managed to resolve in their favour. 
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The Independent State of Croatia was inhabited by 6.3 million people, 
which gave it the greatest concentration of population in Yugoslavia. 
(Wartime Serbia only had a population of 3.8 million.) It will be recalled 
(see p. 39 above) that 37% of this population were Moslem Croats, 30% 
were Serbs, and 23% were Croatian Catholics. The Moslems were the 
descendants of members of the medieval Bosnian church who had 
converted to Islam and received family farms under the Turks. Some of 
them had become members of the Bosnian feudal class during the 
nineteenth century. The Moslems, therefore, generally occupied higher 
positions in the social hierarchy: they were the landowners and. wealth-
ier peasants and monopolised the commercial activities of the towns in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbs were the descendants of the poor 
peasants who had born the brunt of Turkish rule. They were still poor 
peasants in spite of the Agrarian Reform; they numbered two million and 
were spread over 65-75% of the territory of the Independent State of 
Croatia. 74 The Croat Catholic population largely lived in Croatia proper. 
Perhaps as a temporary measure the Ustase proclaimed the Moslem 
population to be 'pure Croat' indeed, many Moslems subsequently 
joined the Ustase ranks - and then concentrated their attention on 
exterminating. the Serb population. The response from the younger 
element in the Serb population to the Ustase pogroms was to take to the 
mountains and forests and organise spontaneous armed resistance. It was 
precisely this which created a crucial political 'market' for the Partisans: a 
large potential reservoir of recruits for the struggle against both foreign and 
domestic enemies. Their arch rivals, the Cetnici, however, were also in the 
same market because the Serbian population turned instinctively to the 
Cetnici for protection against the Ustase. The most important battle of the 
War was, therefore, for the hearts and minds of the Serbian population of 
the Independent State of Croatia, and thus one of the most important 
moves which the Partisans made in the War was to go northwards from 
Foca into western Bosnia (part of the independent state of Croatia - see p. 
39 above.) 
The Partisans ultimately won this battle, and some of their ernest units 
were to come from the Serb areas of the Independent State of Croatia: from 
the Lika, from the Kordun, from the Bosnian Krajina and from eastern 
Herzegovina. This was not achieved, however, without a hard struggle in 
which the Cetnici infiltrated many Partisan units, disarmed them and shot 
their CPY officers. 
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Some of the reasons why the Partisans prevailed have already been 
touched upon. Their all-Yugoslav revolutionary nationalism always 
seemed more likely to have a better reception than another dose of Greater 
Serbia chauvinism among poor Serbian peasants who had already 
expressed their desire for a federated Yugoslavia during the interwar period 
through the Independent Democratic Party (see p. 25 above). In addition, 
the Partisans always behaved impeccably towards the local population 
and proved their worth in the fight against the foreign enemy and the 
Ustase, while the Cetnici slipped into collaboration, ceased fighting the 
Ustase and often behaved in a dissolute manner. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that the Partisans were given some 
assistance in their task by the friction between their enemies in the 
Independent State of Croatia. As was described above (see p. 39), the 
Independent State of Croatia was divided into German and Italian 
occupied zones (see Map 1). Although the German commanding officers 
on the spot probably recognised that theUstase reign of terror was 
counter-productive; they could not put a stop to it because it was in line 
with Hitler's racist designs. In contrast the Italians tended to favour the 
Serbian population in their zone, which meant that they did their best to 
discourage the Ustase by expelling them to the German zone, and they also 
used Cetnici as auxiliary troops. These policies brought the Italians into 
conflict with the UstaSe regime, and with the Germans who had to deal 
with Ustase complaints. None of this was conducive to effective joint 
action against the Partisans. Moreover, the Italians effectively gave the 
Partisans a free hand in western Bosnia, when they decided to withdraw 
their troops into zone I from zones II and III early in 1942 (as shown in 
Map 1). 
When Italy capitulated in September 1943, the fortunes of the Partisan~ 
were on the rise and their enemies could only pretend to show a united 
front. The Partisans collected large amounts of Italian arms and equip-
ment, while the Cetnici lost an important source of supply. The Partisans 
benefitted from an influx of Croats, particularly of deserters from the 
domobrani (see p. 39 above), while in order to obtain arms and ammuni-
tion, the Cetnici were forced into an uneasy alliance with the Ustase, who 
were their sworn enemies, and with the Germans, who were always suspi-
cious of their motives. The Croatian Peasant Party could not hope to 
capture any middle ground because it had isolated itself by passively 
accepting German and Italian occupation and the Ustase regime. At this 
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point the crucial struggle over the terrain of the Independent State of 
Croatia, for the support of its inhabitants, had been decided in favour of 
the Partisans. 
Laying the Foundations for a New Yugoslavia 
During the early stages of the uprising in 1941, the CPY had been content 
with destroying the remains of the existing state apparatus which had been 
taken over by the occupying powers and their quisling puppets. In 
particular, the Partisans burned records and police flIes in any town which 
they captured. Very soon, however, it became clear to the leadership of the 
CPY that future political and military success depended in part upon the 
establishment of the embryo of a new state structure in the liberated areas. 
This would faciliate the war effort and have the effect of broadening the 
Partisans' popular base. Thus it was that at the Stolice consultation (Stolice 
being a small town in western Serbia) between national and provincial 
leaderships of the uprising on 26 September 1941, a decision was taken to 
set up national liberation committees (narodnooslobodilacki odbon). These 
committees would be elected by the local inhabitants and constitute organs 
of government for their particular areas. Furthermore, a hierarchy oflocal, 
district and regional committees quickly developed. At Uzice in November 
1941, for example, a national liberation committee for the whole of Serbia 
was formed. 
Later, in February 1942 at Foca, the success of the initial experiments 
with the national liberation committees caused the Supreme Command to 
issue a directive governing the role and tasks of national liberation com-
mittees and the electoral procedure for their establishment. Clearly, the 
role of these committees was subordinate to the war effort: they were 
responsible for food supplies, billeting, medical facilities, workshops etc. 
Nevertheless, they did fulfil the important function of distancing the CPY 
from direct government to some degree, allowing non-CPY members and 
those not able to fight to play some role in the war effort. In other words, 
they provided a broader popular base for the Partisans. 
Once the Supreme Command had arrived in Bihac in western Bosnia 
towards the end of 1942, it was felt that the time was ripe for further moves 
to consolidate the political legitimacy of the Partisans. Bihac lay in a wide 
corridor of liberated territory, where there was no immediate threat from 
enemy forces. At Bihac, therefore, the first session of the Anti-Fascist 
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Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifasisticka Veca 
Narodnog Oslobodjenja Jugoslavije, A VNOJ) took place on 26 and 27 
November 1942. It was attended by delegates from all over Yugoslavia, 
including some individual members of former urban parties and some 
prominent artists and literary figures (Vladimir Nazor, the celebrated 
Croatian poet, was one of the VIPs). The objective of the A VN OJ was to 
create as broad a popular anti-fascist front as possible, in order to attract 
people to the national liberation struggle without them necessarily having 
to subscribe to CPY politics. To this end an anti-fascist women's council 
and an anti-fascist youth council were also formed. The A VNOJ delegates 
elected a national committee which the CPY was keen should declare itself 
as the le~timate government of Yugoslavia, unilaterally replacing the King 
and the government in exile. The German armies, however, were very close 
to Stalingrad, and Stalin put a stop to this initiative because he did not wish 
to antagonise Britain and the United States at this difficult point in time. 
After emerging intact from the Fourth and Fifth Enemy Offensives, the 
CPY and the nationalcommittee of the A VNOJ set about preparations for 
a second session of the A VN OJ. 146 delegates attended this session from 
the regional anti-fascist councils of most of Yugoslavia. It was held on 29 
November 1943 in the town of Jajce in western Bosnia, and the decision 
was taken to press ahead with the formation of a new Yugoslavia. A 
National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia was elected and 
proclaimed as the new government of a federal Yugoslavia. The govern-
ment in exile was formally divested of its powers and the King forbidden to 
return to the country. Stalin tried to prevent the publishing of these deci-
sions which he again saw as poisoning his relations with Britain and the 
United States. (The Teheran Conference had just taken place.) This time, 
however, he was presented with afait accompli, and all that he could do was 
urge the CPY to tone down the presentation of any socialist measures 
which the new government envisaged. In this the CPY complied. 
After this second session of the A VNOJ, another important political 
event occurred as a new political organisation came into being: the United 
National Liberation Front (Jedinstveni Narodnooslobodilacki Front). This 
was to group together all anti-fascist political forces in a broad alliance and 
was less ideologically restrictive than the CPY, although, of course, the 
CPY was the leading political force within it. The idea was that while the 
A VNOJ was the executive embryo of a new structure of state power, this 
Front was to be the main political organisation, with the CPY eschewing 
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direct control over the levers of power in order to broaden the appeal of the 
struggle. 
Subsequently, the Allies started to jostle over post-war spheres of 
influen"Ce, ahdthe new Yugoslav governinent of the National Committee 
for the Liberation of Yugoslavia was caught in the middle. Churchill put 
pressure on Tito to enter a coalition with the government in exile and take 
the King back as the price for international recognition. Later he 
persuaded Stalin to agree to a 50-50 division of Yugoslavia into British and 
Soviet spheres of influence. Tito recognised, however, that the political 
cards were stacked in his favour - a large army was under his command 
and his government enjoyed far greater political legitimacy than the 
government in exile - and he was, therefore, able to· thwart the plans of the 
Great Powers. He met twice with a representative of the government in 
exile, Ivan Subasic, on the island of Vis in mid-1944. There it was agreed 
that a coalition government would be formed but that Tito would 
immediately assume exclusive command of all Yugoslav armed forces on 
Yugoslav territory, which meant that the government in exile formally 
dropped all support for Mihailovic. Later, in Belgrade, Tito and Subasic 
agreed that the issue of the King would be left for the people to decide. On 7 
March 1945, the Provisional People's Government of Democratic Federal 
Yugoslavia was formed, including representatives of the government in 
exile, and it immediately acquired international recognition by the Great 
Powers. Thereafter, the people elected for a republic; the representatives of 
the government in exile were politically isolated and forced to resign, and 
all the formal levers of power passed into the hands of the Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND THE LINKS WITH THE FUTURE 
Clearly the fundamental cause of the Yugoslav revolution was the contra-
dictions in and collapse of the interwar regime. The combination of 
economic stalemate, falling living standards, a particular pattern of exter-
nal dependency and the asymmetry between economic and political power 
experienced by Croatia, both fomented crisis and prevented ruling groups 
from presenting a united front. The regime was paralysed and fmally split 
asunder under the impact of the Second World War. Internecine conflict 
then spilled over into the War, and this produced the extreme polarisation 
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represented by the Ustase on the one hand and the Cetnici on the other. All 
these factors compensated for the intrinsic weakness of the labour 
movement and allowed a small Communist Party to challenge for power. 
Thus the Yugoslav revolution like most revolutions - Cuba and Nicaragua 
being notable and more recent examples - was as much made by the 
illegitimacy, disunity, opportunism and excesses of the Opposition as by 
the ideological appeals and tactical manoeuvres of the revolutionary 
organisation itself. Indeed, with respect to the latter it is interesting to note 
that the Yugoslav Communist Party was successful partly because its 
popular front tactic did not (and could not) work, rather than because it 
did. 
Nevertheless, two other factors also stand out. One of these is the 
crucial move northwards into western Bosnia made by the Supreme 
Command and the main mobile force of Partisans in the middle of 1942. 
This allowed them to capitalise on the dire situation being faced by Serbs 
outside of Serbia, counter-posing a non-exclusive all-Yugoslav ideology to 
the Greater Serbia chauvinism of the Cetnici. The other is the somewhat 
fortuitous capitulation ofItaly in 1943 which both allowed the Partisans to 
seize on a sizeable and necessary source of armaments and deprived the 
Cetnici of an important source of material support. 
While the specific mix of factors which made the Yugoslav revolution 
possible was obviously unique, and although it is also risky to generalise, it 
is worthwhile noting certain similarities between the circumstances which 
have fomented socialist transformations during the twentieth century and 
which were also present in the Yugoslav case. 
1. All of the countries concerned were integrated into the world division of 
labour as primary commodity exporting economies, and they all had 
become so during the stage of the expansion of Western capitalism when 
the search for food and raw materials began in earnest on a world scale 
and the periphery was being increasingly spatially reorganised for 
capitalist purposes. 
2. These countries have all had largely agrarian economies with low 
absolute levels of development of the productive forces, and they have 
exhibited a combination of different forms of production and surplus 
extraction. 
3. In correspondence with their importance as suppliers of food and raw 
materials to Western capitalist countries, the strategic sectors of their 
economies were under the control of foreign capital. 
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4. Significant indigenous initiatives in the direction of industrialisation, 
if there were any, were generally being carried out under the auspices 
of the state or foreign capital, rather than by a 'domestic bourgeoisie'. 
On· the other hand, since the War, iUlti-colonialism has obviously 
played a greater role; generalised 'hot' war has been absent - being 
replaced by generalised 'cold' war and the nature of dependency 
relationships has become more complex and progressed to a new stage. 
This stage has involved a greater degree of industrialisation in the periph-
ery, along with extensive participation by multinational companies often 
in close collaboration with local states, and has been associated with 
authoritarian and/or populist military intervention in the political sphere. 
The countries which have exhibited the characteristics listed above, and 
which have experienced revolution, have thus been much more marginal to 
the nerve centres of capital accumulation, left behind in a rapidly changing 
international division of labour. 
With respect to the ways in which the political economy of the 
Yugoslav revolution left its imprint upon the post-war development of 
socialist Yugoslavia itself, two areas stand out. First of all, and perhaps 
contrary to expectations, upon achieving power the Communist Party did 
not use the wartime legacy of chaos as an opportunity to unleash full-scale 
socialisation on the agricultural sector. Rather, a much longer-term 
gradualist approach was adopted. The links between this approach to 
agricultural policy and the legacy of the revolution are clearly expressed by 
Petranovi6 and Strbac: 
The peasantry in Yugoslavia had long been individual owner-occupiers, and on the other 
hand had participated in the national liberation struggle on a very large scale. Thus, to deprive 
every man of his right to own land would have been an act which would not have been 
understood and would undoubtedly have provoked political ferment, particularly among the 
ranks of the middle peasantry who had played an active role in the war and occupied key 
positions in the structure of the national liberation movement. Moreover, the technical base of 
Yugoslav agriculture was not sufficiently developed to contemplate an overnight transition 
to large-scale agricultural production.75 
While the Communist Party had taken large strides in terms of raising 
socialist consciousness among the partisans during the War, national 
liberation had been the overriding issue. 
Thus the Agrarian Reform of 1945 was pragmatic, concentrating on 
redistribution to achieve specific objectives rather than on socialisation.76 
This approach was reiterated, both when the First Five Year Plan was 
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launched in 1947 and again in response to Cominform attacks at the Fifth 
Congress of the Conununist Party, where Kardelj in particular warned 
against forcing the pace of socialisation in the agricultural sector.77 The. 
short-lived collectivisation drive between 1949 and 1953 was thus an 
aberration prompted by the turmoil surrounding expulsion from the 
Cominform and by food shortages in the towns. It was gradually reversed 
(starting in December 1949), however, because of a lack of whole-hearted 
political commitment, organisational difficulties and unrest among the 
peasantry caused by the combination of drought, a harsh requisitioning 
policy, the taxation system, unfavourable movements in the internal terms 
of trade and shortages of industrial goods in the countryside.78 
Thus it was that the policy towards the agricultural sector returned to 
form, and the original strategy of voluntarism preserved peasant agri-
culture alongside a relatively small state sector. This dovetailed with the 
level of consciousness among the peasantry, and it provided the Yugoslav 
population with a better and more varied diet than its Soviet counterpart. 
The problems with this strategy have only recently begun to emerge as the 
country, in need of increased food output to generate foreign exchange 
(directly as well as indirectly through provision for the tourist trade), fmds 
itself with a relatively backward peasant agriculture and a rural labour 
force denuded of younger people. 
Secondly, on different levels two major links can be established with 
some degree of certainty between the political economy of the revolution 
and self-management itself. First of all and most concretely, there is a direct 
link which runs from the establishment of the People's Liberation 
Committees during the war, through the immediate post-war legislation 
concerning these conunittees, to the beginning of an experiment with 
workers' councils in December 1949 and the subsequent passing of the 
'Basic Law On The Management Of State Economic Enterprises And 
Higher Economic Combines By Work Collectives' in June 1950, which 
inaugurated the initial stages of self-management.79 In May 1949, a new 
law increasing the powers and responsibilities oflocal People's Conunittees 
went through parliament, and it was introduced by the Communist Party's 
most creative and practical theoretician, Edward Kardelj. Kardelj used the 
occasion to make a major political statement, referring to the wartime 
experience and the specificity of the Yugoslav revolution and making a 
detailed critique of the Eastern European concept of 'people's democracy' 
as the bridge between capitalism and socialism, as well as a critique of 
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Soviet 'bureaucratic centralism' itself and of 'bourgeois democracy'. Most 
importantly, though, he fIrmly indicated that this law was only a fIrst step 
along a path which would involve increased democratic participation at all 
levels 'of society:-
Self-management would be an empty phrase without a constant, ever widening drawing in of 
the mass of the people as managers at all levels of their state. For us, to be sure, it isn't 
sufficient that the mass of the people participate only in people's committees and in parlia-
ments via their elected representatives. If we were to remain at this stage we would be more of 
a parliamentary, than a people's socialist democracy. The workers can and must participate in 
the management of the state in other ways, such as occurs through various commissions and 
councils etc, through people's committees, through village activities, through people's 
inspectorates and many other like forms. All this activity must constantly develop and gain in 
popularity. 
In many of our factories, for example, where there is an innovative and intelligent director, 
it can be seen that his success depends upon the commitment and initiative of the workers, 
who are beginning to develop yet another new form of self-management by the people. This is 
the constant consultations between the director and groups of the best workers about all 
questions concerning the management of the enterprise. Without compromising the principle 
of the personal accountability of the director, workers and functionaries are able to 
participate, alongside the director, in the running of the factory. They are able to elaborate 
their own critical observations and to put forward concrete proposals. This underdeveloped 
and spontaneous form must be developed still further and turned into an established form of 
direct co-operation with the workers in the running of our enterprises. Such and similar forms 
of participation by the workers in the running of the state are great steps forward in the 
development of our socialist democracy, and really put into practice the principle of direct 
participation by producers in the management of the economy which Marx and Engels stood 
for. In our country such forms remain possible because of the high level of consciousness of 
our working class and its very close links with the Communist Party. These aspects of our 
people's democracy must develop not -only horizontally but also vertically and thus ever 
higher organs of economic management will be drawn into the sphere of direct collaboration 
with worker-producers.8o 
This is a lengthy but worthwhile quotation because it clearly establishes 
the links between this piece oflegislation and the self-managing enterprise, 
and it also demonstrates the clear strategic vision which Kardelj possessed 
even at this early stage. It also reveals that Djilas's anecdotal claim that he, 
Kardelj and Kidric (the planning minister) invented self-management 
while sitting together in a car in the spring of 1950 is in fact unfounded. 81 
Moreover, at a more abstract level the inauguration of self-manage-
ment, while being a defIant challenge to Stalin, was also perhaps the only 
course which the leadership of the Communist Party could have charted 
without running a serious risk of destabilising the regime. The period 
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between expulsion from the Cominform in June 1948 and the beginnings of 
self-management was turbulent indeed. Not only did isolation from the 
Soviet bloc make itself felt directly in economic terms through the 
blockade, the Five Year Plan was also encountering difficulties on its own 
account, particularly in the industrial sector. At this conjuncture, which 
required vigorous and decisive action, the leadership of the Communist 
Party had, broadly speaking, two options. On the one hand, it could have 
tightened its grip on the economy and encouraged a centralised, coercive 
mould of government - this option being dictated by circumstance, quite 
apart from any question of imitating the Soviet model more closely. On the 
other hand, it could liberalise and decentralise, allowing anonymous 
market forces, and the workers themselves, to apply the necessary 
measures of austerity. . 
In the event, after initially attempting to pursue both options at once, 
the leadership took t~e second option and inaugurated self-management, 
abandoned the collectivisation drive and began to remodel the whole 
economic system. This was the option which was in tune with the character 
of the revolution that, more than many others, enjoyed mass popular 
support in both the towns and the countryside. Any prolonged attempts at 
the centralised coercive option would have been severely debilitating. In 
this sense, therefore, it can be said that at a critical moment, history nudged 
the Yugoslavs along the path of decentralisation, self-management and 
non-aligment. 
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